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ENCOURAGING CORPORATE CHARITY
Linda Sugin*
The tax law governing corporate philanthropy is stuck in an
archaic notion of corporate charity that does not necessarily benefit
either charities or corporatestakeholders.Four developments in the last
few years provoked this reexamination of the Internal Revenue Code
and its awkward dichotomy between business expenses and charitable
contributions. They offer new reasons for replacing the charitable
contribution deduction for corporations with a business expense
deduction: (1) a statutory reduction in the rate of tax on dividends
received by individual shareholders, (2) empirical evidence showing
very low effective tax rates paid by corporations, (3) death of the
preeminent model of corporatephilanthropy - Berkshire Hathaway's
shareholder-designation program, and (4) adoption of final
capitalization regulations that significantly weaken the capitalization
requirement and no longer pose much of an obstacle to immediate
deduction of corporate payments to charities. This seemingly small
legal change offers many benefits in today's climate: it would increase
the coherence of a corporation'stax treatment, help to minimize the
agency costs in corporate philanthropy, and change the way that
corporations define their charitable endeavors, encouraging greater
overall corporatecommitment to charitable and community needs, both
within and outside their business operations.

* Professor of Law, Fordham University. I would like to thank Laurie Malman for
helpful comments and Shadi Shukri and Bing Luke for research assistance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The tax law's charitable deduction for corporations is a quaint
anachronism, but not because corporate charity is dead. Rather,
corporate charitable giving may now be more important than ever to
both charities and corporations. Charities are struggling with declines
in, government funding and corporations, having suffered some very
bad press in the post-Enron world, are increasingly conscious of the
need to burnish their images. The amount that corporations give to
' See

Ian Wilhelm, Big Business Doing More for Charity, CHRON.
Aug. 5, 2004, at 7, 8. The statistics on corporate giving over the last
few years have been somewhat affected by the tremendous outpouring of charitable
support following the September 11 terrorist attacks, showing a decline in the
PHILANTHROPY,
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charities has been growing2 and consumers increasingly believe that
corporations should participate in philanthropy.3 Nevertheless, the

tax law governing corporate philanthropy is stuck in an archaic notion
of corporate charity that does not necessarily benefit either charities
or corporate stakeholders. As the important issues of corporate social
responsibility have shifted and relevant aspects of the tax law have
evolved, the charitable deduction for corporations has become
functionally obsolete.
Today, the shining model of corporate

philanthropy has died,4 corporate charitable giving is decreasingly
distinguishable from other business expenses, and ordinary business
expenses increasingly implicate social responsibility issues that are
shared across philanthropic and profit-making endeavors.5
The corporate deduction for charitable gifts was never completely

consistent with the theory or doctrine of section 1706 and changes in
both the tax law's treatment of dividends and the accepted practices of
business suggest that the special deduction for charitable giving by
corporations be replaced by the ordinary business deduction, which
broadly governs ordinary and necessary business expenses. While it
may seem unremarkable to alter the treatment of corporate
philanthropy by shifting a deduction from one Internal Revenue Code
(Code) section to another, in light of recent developments, it offers
significant promise for improving the law. It would offer significant
advantages for corporate shareholders, the tax system, and charities: it
succeeding year. See Ian Wilhelm, Corporate Giving Takes a Dip, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, July 24, 2003, at 6, 6.
2 Charitable donations from corporations and their foundations increased 4.2%
in 2003, to $13.46 billion. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA
FOUNDATION, GIVING USA 2004, at 83 (2004) [hereinafter GIVING USA 2004].
However, corporate giving has declined as a percentage of profits over time. Michael
E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy,
HARV. Bus. REV., Dec. 2002, at 56-57.
3 See Press Release, Cone Inc., 'Tis the Season for Cause-Related Shopping
(Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.coneinc.com/Pages/pr_22.html (describing the 2003 Cone
Holiday Trend Tracker).
4 See infra Part III.
5 In a recent study, consumers favored support of community philanthropy but
cared even more about employee benefits and human rights in manufacturing, which
are core business issues as well as social issues. See Press Release, Cone Inc., MultiYear Study Finds 21% Increase in Americans Who Say Corporate Support of Social
Issues Is Important in Building Trust (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.coneinc.com/
Pages/pr_30.html (describing the 2004 Cone Corporate Citizenship Study).
6 See generally Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax
Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Construction of Charity, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994).
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would increase the coherence of a corporation's tax treatment,
simplify the Code's approach to corporate expenses, operate to
minimize the agency costs in corporate philanthropy, and help
rationalize the tax treatment of charitable giving for individuals. It
could also change the way that corporations give to charity and define
their charitable endeavors, encouraging a greater overall corporate
commitment to charitable and community needs, and promoting
better tailoring of corporate gifts to those needs.
Four developments in the last few years require reexamination of
the Code's awkward dichotomy between business expenses and
charitable contributions and provide new reasons for considering
whether the Code's treatment of corporate charity is defensible: (1) a
statutory reduction in the rate of tax on dividends received by
individual shareholders, 7 (2) empirical evidence showing very low
average effective tax rates paid by corporations,' (3) cessation of
Berkshire Hathaway's charitable giving program, and (4) adoption of
final capitalization regulations that significantly undercut the
traditional capitalization requirement that limits deductions otherwise
allowable under section 162.'
This article is organized as follows: Part II describes the problems
created by the section 170 deduction for corporations. It discusses the
unintended bias the Code has long contained in favor of charitable
giving by corporations instead of their shareholders and how the
recent changes in the tax treatment of dividends and the tax profile of
corporations turn that bias around. It describes the invitation to
managerial abuse that section 170 may encourage and which section
162 may control. It explains why section 170's standard for
deductibility is incoherent for corporations, encourages corporate
foundation building, and privileges in-kind gifts compared to cash.
In the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA),
Congress amended section 1(h) to provide that dividends received by individuals are
taxed as "net capital gain," subject to a preferential rate of tax that does not exceed
15%. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 302(a), 117 Stat. 752, 760-61 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)). Prior to
that legislation, dividends were taxed at ordinary income rates, which are currently as
high as 35%. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
8 According to a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study, 61%
of U.S.
corporations reported no tax liabilities and 94% reported liabilities of less than 5% of
their total income.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
7

COMPARISON

OF

THE

REPORTED

TAX

LIABILITIES

OF

FOREIGN-

AND

U.S.-

1996-2000,
at 6-7
(2004),
available
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04358.pdf [hereinafter GAO, COMPARISON].
9 T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B.
447.
CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS,
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Part III reviews Berkshire Hathaway's unique resolution of both the
bias problem and the related agency-cost problem created by
corporate philanthropy. It analyzes that company's decision to end its
shareholder-designation program and the failure of other companies
to adopt its exemplary corporate-governance model on this issue.
Part IV assumes that the section 170 deduction for corporations for
''payments" to charity was functionally necessary because the
capitalization requirement that attaches to accrued section 162
deductions would have effectively negated the deduction in many
instances.
It argues that the recently finalized capitalization
0
regulations would allow corporations to deduct most of their
charitable gifts immediately under section 162. Finally, Part V argues
that the availability of only a section 162 deduction might do more to
encourage total corporate spending on a broad range of desirable
goals - such as living wages and health insurance for workers and
environmental protection, in addition to payments to nonprofit
organizations - and there is no reason to privilege corporate gifts to
section 501(c)(3) organizations over current expenditures for workers,
community, and the natural environment in which the company
operates, or vice versa.
II. CURRENT LAW PROBLEMS

A. Bias
The tax law has long contained a bias in favor of charitable giving
by corporations compared to charitable giving by individual
shareholders following distributions by corporations. In a system with
a separate corporate tax, a charitable contribution made by a
corporation and deducted at the corporate level can generally be
larger than a contribution that an individual shareholder can make out
of a corporate distribution of the same available funds because the
corporate tax burdens the funds distributed to shareholders, but not
the funds contributed to charity.1 The tax law's bias in favor of
corporate philanthropy compared to individual philanthropy out of
corporate distributions could suggest a governmental policy in favor
of charitable giving by corporations. But there is no evidence that
Congress purposely adopted such a policy; the bias arose out of the
basic operation of a classical system of taxation in conjunction with an
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a) (2004).

" The section 170 deduction zeroes out the tax on the contributed amount,
regardless of the corporation's marginal rate.
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ordinary-income rate applicable to dividends received by
shareholders, rather than out of any articulated federal policy in favor
of corporate philanthropy over shareholder philanthropy. A review
of the history surrounding the adoption of the deduction for
charitable giving by corporations makes it clear that Congress was
unaware of the bias that it was creating. It seems rather that Congress
believed that it was putting corporate philanthropy on a level
equivalent to individual philanthropy. 2
Despite the fact that the bias was accidental, policymakers should
long ago have considered whether it makes sense to have a tax system
that privileges giving by corporations.
There was never any
compelling reason to subsidize corporate contributions more than
contributions made by shareholders out of dividends they have
received. If there is no connection to corporate business or the better
information or expertise that corporations have, there is no reason to
have a federal policy in the Code that prefers giving at the corporate
level." In addition, as discussed below, under current law the bias
might be in favor of corporate giving for some taxpayers and in favor
of individual giving out of dividends for other taxpayers,
demonstrating an incoherent federal policy concerning charitable
giving by corporations and shareholders.
What is the bias? Consider the following example: A corporation,
which has a marginal tax rate of 35%, has just earned $100 cash
income that it does not need for operations. It can either pay the
amount out to its shareholders as a dividend or it can give the amount
to charity. For purposes of this comparison, assume that the
shareholders who receive a distribution would contribute that amount
to charity. The Code provides a charitable deduction to whichever
taxpayer makes the contribution, the corporation or the shareholder.
If they are each subject to a marginal rate of 35%, then it would not
seem to matter where the contribution was made.
But it always has mattered because of the corporate tax. If the
When Congress adopted the deduction for corporations in the Revenue Act
of 1935, the Ways and Means Committee Report stated: "If corporations are public
spirited enough to make contributions to charities, we believe their contributions for
such purposes should be exempt from taxation exactly as is done in the case of
individuals." H.R. REP. No. 74-1681, at 20 (1935), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN,
SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861, at 286
(1938) (emphasis added).
13 I have previously made this argument. See Linda Sugin, Theories
of the
Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 835 (1997).
12
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corporation makes the contribution, the amount received by the
charity is $100 because the $100 taxable income to the corporation is
offset by a $100 section 170 deduction on account of the gift. If the
individual makes the contribution, the corporation receives no
deduction for the distribution and must pay tax at the corporate level.
Consequently, the shareholder only starts out with $65, the net
dividend from the corporation. If the shareholder donates that
amount to charity, the inclusion of the dividend in income is offset by
a deduction for the contribution, allowing the shareholder to pay the
full amount of the dividend to charity, without any diminution on
account of tax. This is illustrated as Example 1 in the succeeding
chart.
Prior to the adoption of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), 14 the rate of dividend
inclusion and charitable deduction to shareholders was the same, so
that an individual shareholder would always have a wash on the
receipt of a dividend followed by a charitable contribution (assuming
full deductibility)." The amount of the bias depended solely on the
rate of tax to which the corporation was subject because it was a byproduct of the corporate tax. If a corporation had a 30% rate of tax
and $100 earnings, the corporate contribution could be $100
compared to the shareholder's equivalent contribution of $70. A 50%
corporate rate would mean a $100 corporate contribution compared
to a $50 shareholder contribution. The higher the corporate rate, the
more bias existed.
The JGTRRA's reduction in the tax rate applicable to dividends
received by individual shareholders changes this analysis because the
inclusion and deduction at the shareholder level are now likely to be
at different rates of tax. The rate change created a mismatch for
shareholders between the inclusion of the dividend and the
corresponding charitable deduction. New section 1(h)(11) thereby
reduced the bias in favor of corporate giving, but did not eliminate it
altogether. Under current law, it may still be true that the corporate
tax makes giving at the corporate level more attractive than giving at
the shareholder level.
JGTRRA changes the prior example as follows: When the
shareholder receives the $65 dividend, she will include it in income at

14

Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,

117 Stat. 752.
15 This analysis ignores the dividend received deduction for corporations
because it models the problem of corporations compared to individuals.
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the 15% rate, but she can still deduct her charitable contribution at
her marginal rate of tax, which may be as high as 35%.16 This allows
the taxpayer to gross up her dividend received by her marginal rate
less 15%. The $65 distribution is subject to $9.75 in income tax,
netting $55.25 after tax. 7 Following through on the comparison, if she
contributes it to charity, she will deduct the full amount of the
contribution at her marginal rate. So she can deduct $55.25 x 1/(1 0.35) = $85. The extra $29.75 is essentially financed by the federal
government on account of the difference between the rate of tax
applicable to the deduction and the rate on the inclusion, a mismatch
in the charity's favor. While the individual contribution here is larger
than in Example 1, the $85 equivalent donation at the shareholder
level is still less than the $100 contribution possible at the corporate
level. Therefore, the greatest federal subsidy of charitable giving still
occurs when the corporation makes the donation, rather than the
shareholder.
Although the difference between the size of the
corporate and shareholder gifts is smaller than it was prior to 2003, it
is still large enough to detect a bias in favor of charitable gifts at the
corporate level. In short, under these assumptions, a charity gets a
bigger donation if it comes straight from the corporation than if it is
paid out to the shareholder as a dividend first, with the federal fisc
making up the difference. This is illustrated in Example 2 in the
succeeding chart.
Both of these examples assume the corporation pays tax at the
statutory 35% rate.1 8 But in addition to the 2003 cuts in the dividend
rate, relevant changes have been occurring in the corporate tax.
While the statute has remained the same, the tax actually paid by
corporations has declined over time,1 9 and most corporations pay little
or no tax. 2° This additional consideration fundamentally changes the
bias question because it creates the possibility that a shareholder
could make a larger donation out of dividended funds than a

See I.R.C. § 1(a).
This is the amount the shareholder could spend on non-deductible
consumption out of the dividend received.
18 I.R.C. §
11.
19 See Adam Carasso, The CorporateIncome Tax in the
Post-War Era, 98 TAX
NOTES 1415, 1415 (Mar. 3, 2003) ("The corporate income tax has been in steady
decline since World War II.);
Patrice E. Treubert, Corporation Income Tax
Returns, 2001, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2004, at 118, 118 (finding that
corporate income tax paid to the federal government decreased by 18.3% from 2000
to 2001).
20 See GAO, COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 6-7.
16
17
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corporation could have made with those same funds.
Consider this example: Assume that a corporation pays tax at a
21
lower rate than its shareholders. If a corporation is subject to a 15%
rate of tax and the shareholders are subject to a 35% rate, then a
contribution would be bigger at the shareholder level than the
corporate level. With $100 in earnings that it can either distribute to
shareholders or contribute to charity, the corporation can (as in the
other examples) contribute $100 to charity because regardless of its
tax rate, the $100 inclusion is offset by a $100 section 170 deduction.
If instead it distributes the amount to shareholders as a dividend, the
shareholders will receive $85 after payment of the corporate tax.
Because dividends are taxed to individuals at a maximum rate of 15%,
the shareholders then have $72.25 to spend on consumption. But, if
the shareholders contribute the amount received to charity, the
deduction is at 35%, allowing the shareholder to gross up her
contribution to an amount in excess of the corporation's would-be
contribution. Grossed-up, the contribution is equal to the dividend
received divided by one minus the tax rate. Thus, the shareholder can
fund a $111 contribution with the dividend received and the tax
22
savings.22 This is illustrated
as Example 3 in the succeeding chart. 23
This gross-up effect is magnified as the corporate rate goes down.
Where the corporation pays no tax, the bias is significantly in favor of
dividends followed by shareholder charitable giving. When dividends
were taxed at the same rate as ordinary income, a zero rate on
corporate income would erase any bias because $100 earnings would
produce $100 dividend or $100 contribution at either the corporate or
shareholder level. The final example in the chart illustrates the
advantages of shareholder giving under the post-JGTRRA tax regime

21 This is not an unrealistic assumption since the statutory top rates are the

same, but corporations have been very successful in reducing their effective rates of
tax. See id.; see also George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations
Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REV. 1793, 1799
(2003) (finding that various industries had six-year average effective tax rates of as
low as 25.72%). The data in the GAO study compares average rates, not marginal
rates. Marginal rates are relevant for determining the value of deductions. The 61%
of corporations with no tax liability have a marginal rate of zero. Corporations with
low effective (average) rates of tax may have marginal rates of 35% because the
graduation of rates in section 11 is minimal. In those cases, Example 2 would provide
the relevant analysis.
2 72.75/(1 - 0.35) = 111.15.
23 These examples assume that the individual taxpayer can use the charitable

deduction in full, without the limitations in section 170(b).
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for corporations that have managed to reduce their rate of tax to
24
zero.
ILLUSTRATION 1.

Corporate
Rate
Individual
Rate
Dividend
Rate
Corporate
Earnings
Corporate
Gift
Individual
Income
Individual

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Example 4

35%

35%

15%

0%

35%

35%

35%

35%

35%

15%

15%

15%

$100

$100

$100

$100

$100*

$100

$100

$100

$65

$65

$85

$100

$65

$85

$111

$131

*The optimal gifts are in bold. Figures have been rounded.

These examples illustrate why the section 170 deduction for
corporations should no longer be understood to reflect a strong policy
in favor of corporate charitable giving. Depending on the tax profile
of corporations and their shareholders, maximizing the federal subsidy
for charitable giving is a tricky exercise.
It is unlikely that
corporations could reasonably engage in this analysis to determine
whether the policy is in their favor in any particular case because they
need too much information about their shareholders. If shareholders
are subject to no tax on their ordinary income, there is no gross-up
effect from the mismatch.25
These examples also show how the federal subsidy for charitable
giving is subject to the vagaries of tax rates and the unique
circumstances of particular corporations and individual shareholders,
conditions that may change without any attention paid to their
coincidental effects on section 501(c)(3) organizations. Why should
the Code encourage corporations to give to charity when shareholders
would be encouraged to give even more, as is most starkly the case in
24 To compute the individual gift amount: 85/(1 - 0.35) = 130.77.

For low-income taxpayers, dividends are taxed at 5%
preserving the arbitrage effect for them. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
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the last example above? If the goal is to maximize charitable giving,
the Code should encourage the taxpayer with the largest value
deduction to make the gift.
Critics may argue that the Code should encourage corporate
giving in this way because the alternative may reduce overall
charitable giving. If section 170 were repealed for corporations, then
corporations might reduce their charitable giving, without any
guarantee that shareholders would pick up the slack. It is possible
that section 170 best supports charities by splitting the deduction
among potential donors. But, as I argue below, corporations would
still be likely to make the most welfare-enhancing contributions they
make today, using the section 162 deduction. The welfare-reducing
contributions are the ones most likely to decline. Of course, it is
impossible to predict whether corporations would, in fact, change
either their overall level of philanthropy or the recipient
organizations. If they would, policymakers need to consider whether
current policy, which effectively tricks shareholders into making larger
total charitable gifts than they otherwise would, is desirable. If we
want to encourage shareholders to give more to charity, a better
policy would be to adjust the incentives more directly to target their
behavior.
Technically, the bias problem is the same under section 162 - the
Code privileges corporate business expenses, compared to dividends.
This is the well-known discrepancy between the treatment of
There is an
dividends and the treatment of interest expense.
us
comfortable
make
should
important difference, however, which
with the section 162 expenses at the corporate level. By definition,
section 162 expenses are incurred in the production of income. They
are necessary to determine the corporation's profitability and they are
incurred so as to increase that profitability. Section 162 expenses
maximize the corporation's wealth because they contribute to the
business. In contrast, section 170 expenses can be wealth-reducing for
the corporation. Therefore, there are synergies in the business
expense model that can create greater overall welfare than are
possible in section 170's wealth-transfer model.26 Bias is only
The corollary issue within the section 162 context is connected to the more
broadly studied issue concerning the reduction in rates on dividends received by
individuals. That is, whether corporations would (and should) pay more out in
dividends on account of that change. With a reduced tax toll charge on paying
dividends, corporate managers need to justify retaining earnings by providing higher
rates of return in the corporation than they would have needed to produce prior to
the rate reduction. This is because shareholders receiving dividends have less to
26
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troublesome if the expenses are not income-producing; section 162
explains why the corporation is the proper taxpayer to have the
deduction.
B. Agency Costs
In the last few decades, the agency-cost problem of corporate

philanthropy has received an increasing amount of attention. Both the
popular press and the academic literature are replete with discussion
of corporate philanthropy that does more to achieve the private

interests of managers than either the public interest, which is the
concern of charitable organizations, or the shareholders' interest,
which is the concern of corporate governance. 2' The problem seems
primarily to be one related to executive compensation; corporate
philanthropy that allows managers to support their favorite causes and
enjoy the prestige benefits of that support is simply a managerial

perquisite.
Conrad Black of Hollinger embodied the abuses that corporate

managers could commit in the context of corporate philanthropy, as
the internal investigation of the company reported:
Between 1996 and 2003, Hollinger and its subsidiaries
donated at least $6.5 million to hundreds of charities in the
invest, after payment of the tax, than retaining corporations, which can effectively
invest a pre-tax amount. The most recent evidence suggests that corporations have
responded to the rate cuts by increasing dividend payout rates. See Gene Amromin et
al., How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices and CorporatePayout
Policy? (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2005-57, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=873879; Steven Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the
Long Run (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 06-06, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886583; Jennifer L. Blouin et al., The Initial Impact of the
2003 Reduction in the Dividend Tax Rate (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=462542).
27 See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet
Charities and
the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct,
Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's
Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998); Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997); Sugin, supra note 13;
Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?,84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1282 (1999).
21
have argued that the tax law should recognize this as executive
compensation where appropriate and tax the executives accordingly. See Sugin, supra
note 13, at 871-72.
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United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel. The
Special Committee recognizes the value and importance of
charitable giving by corporations, and believes that the
Company should make contributions to charitable causes in
reasonable amounts, and under appropriate approval
The beneficiaries of corporate charitable
procedures.
donations ought to be the charities (through their receipt of
the funds) and the donating corporations (through
reputational and other intangible benefits, as well as any tax
benefits). As detailed below, however, Hollinger's charitable
giving during this time period was tainted by a number of
factors, including Black's and Radler's usurpation of public
credit for Hollinger's charitable giving. While [the company]
had charitable trusts with established donation parameters,
Black and Radler also arranged on many occasions for
donations to be made without adhering to those strictures.
Moreover, many of Hollinger's charitable donations were
made to organizations selected by Black, Amiel Black, and
Radler, and often were publicly attributed to them, not to the
Company.... Without consulting outside experts, the Audit
Committee or the Board, Black and Radler directed
thousands of Hollinger's dollars in contributions to pet
charities of their friends and other Hollinger directors, even
in years when Hollinger reported a net loss. In return, they
often served on charity boards or attended lavish events,
particularly in New York. Hollinger never publicly disclosed
its charitable donations or the benefits that the Blacks and
Radlers received through the shareholders' gifts.29
The section 170 deduction for corporations may be the reason
why corporate philanthropy is an agency-cost problem that benefits
managers in the same way as executive compensation. Section 170 is
oblivious to corporate governance issues; it does not require that
contributions be in the best interest of the business of the corporation,
does not require that the public benefits outweigh any loss suffered by
the corporation, and provides no limit on the discretionary power of
managers.

29

GORDON A.

PARIS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

BY THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL INC. 409-

at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/
available
10
(2004),
000095012304010413/y01437exv99w2.htm.
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The Delaware courts have incorporated this insensitivity into
state law by adopting the Code's standards in determining whether a

contribution is reasonable in amount and reasonable in purpose under
Delaware law, so any amount that would be properly deducted under
section 170 is presumed acceptable under state law.30 In addition,
there is no federal regulation outside of the Code - no substantive

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and not even
a requirement that corporations disclose their charitable activities.31
Although these costs can add up, as agency-cost problems go,
corporate philanthropy is low on the list." The problem of explicit

executive compensation in the forms of cash, stock, and perks compared to the implicit compensation in controlling corporate
philanthropy -

so dwarfs the agency costs of corporate charitable

giving that it is reasonable to argue that we should just ignore the
problem in corporate philanthropy.3 3 The egregious examples like
30 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); see

also Sugin, supra note 13, at 857.
31 There have been efforts to adopt such a rule.

In 1997, Rep. Paul Gillmor
proposed two bills requiring corporate disclosure and shareholder participation in
charitable giving. H.R. 944, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 945, 105th Cong. (1997). Rep.
Gillmor introduced a similar bill in 2002 targeting donations to organizations
affiliated with corporate officers and directors. H.R. 3745, 107th Cong. (2002). An
initial draft of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the House, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 7(a)(2)
(as passed by House, Apr. 24, 2002), included a disclosure requirement for a
corporation's charitable gifts and its board members' charitable organization
affiliations but the adopted legislation failed to do so. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. The New York Stock Exchange Listing
Standards include the following rule:
[A] listed company shall disclose.., contributions made by the listed
company to any tax exempt organization in which any independent director
serves as an executive officer if, within the preceding three years,
contributions in any single fiscal year from the listed company to the
organization exceeded the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such tax exempt
organization's consolidated gross revenues.
NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b) (2004). For a fuller discussion of
these developments, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and CorporateSocial Transparency,112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
32 Einer Elhauge argues that agency-cost donations are likely to substitute for
other agency costs, rather than increase total agency costs, and therefore, on net, are
more likely to increase shareholder welfare than other agency costs. See Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
835-39 (2005).
33 Even in the Hollinger debacle, charitable giving abuses were only one of many
examples of overreaching and self-interest described in the report. See PARIS ET AL.,
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Hollinger, in which a founding shareholder treated a public company
like his personal fiefdom, or the Delaware case of Kahn v. Sullivan,34

in which Occidental built a museum to satisfy the ego of its
megalomaniacal CEO, are few and far between. Most managers are
not that powerful or shameless, nor are they that creative in their selfaggrandizement.

The Delaware courts have long taken a passive

approach, which explains why Armand Hammer succeeded in
building his museum despite chancery court review.35 The implicit
assumption underlying this hands-off approach is that the public

benefits from section 501(c)(3) organizations are sufficient to justify a
wealth transfer from corporate shareholders to a charity's
beneficiaries. In fact, the classic cases explicitly highlight the benefits
to the recipient charitable beneficiaries, compared to the magnitude
36
From a welfarist
of the loss to the corporation's shareholders.
perspective, transferring money from shareholders to charitable
organizations of all sorts is likely to increase overall societal welfare,
either because the organizations produce public goods that benefit

more people than the corporation or because the beneficiaries of
charitable organizations have higher marginal utility for the benefits
they receive. Even with the loss of value from agency costs, the total
welfare gains to society from corporate philanthropy are likely to
dwarf the loss to shareholders.
Nevertheless, the welfare gains could be increased if the law could
better distinguish agency-cost philanthropy from welfare-maximizing
supra note 29, at 60-71. Conrad Black and his associates managed to siphon off
virtually all the corporation's profits. See id. at 1.
34 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
35 In Kahn, the court reviewed a settlement of shareholder litigation that
allowed the challenged project to go forward with minor changes. Id.
36 See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
In this case, the court stated:
It is accordingly obvious, in my opinion, that the relatively small loss of
immediate income otherwise payable to... stockholders, had it not been
for the gift in question, is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing
from the placing of such gift in channels where it serves to benefit those in
need ....
Id.; see also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) ("[T]here is
now widespread belief throughout the nation that free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning are vital to our democracy and the system of
free enterprise and that withdrawal of corporate authority to make such contributions
within reasonable limits would seriously threaten their continuance."). In Theodora,
the court also noted that the contribution only cost the shareholders fifteen cents per
dollar of contribution. 257 A.2d at 405.
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philanthropy. The choice is not only between allowing all corporate
philanthropy or prohibiting it all. The challenge is to isolate only the
welfare-reducing examples of agency-cost philanthropy while allowing
the rest to flourish. Scholars have suggested that shareholders could
decide if they approve of the corporation's charitable choices and a
disclosure requirement would enable shareholders to sell their stock if
they disagreed with the philanthropic choices the managers made."
But a disclosure requirement is likely to be ineffectual because
shareholders do not pay attention to disclosure, and even if they did,
they would be unlikely to make ownership decisions based on the
corporation's decision to give away a very small percentage of the
company's profits.
The only exception to this expectation of
reasonable shareholder apathy might be highly publicized gifts to
politically charged causes."' Replacing the section 170 deduction with
a deduction under section 162 is a better approach than disclosure
because it does not rely on shareholder activism, but rather imposes
obligations on the corporate bureaucracy to substantiate its expenses.
It also reins in the unfettered freedom that section 170 now gives
managers to donate up to 10% of the corporation's income to any
section 501(c)(3) organization they choose, subject only to internal
governance constraints that a board might choose to adopt.3 9 It is only
for the small set of corporate contributions that are not justified by
the corporation's business that a separate deduction under section 170
is necessary, and as the next section discusses, those are a shrinking
subset of all corporate philanthropic expenditures.
C. Strategic Philanthropy,PhilanthropicOperations,and the
Duberstein Standard
The use of the word "bias" in Part II.A, rather than "incentive," is
deliberate because there is no evidence that the deduction for
charitable contributions of corporations causes them to give amounts
to charity, rather than paying the amount out as a dividend. Rather
than providing an incentive to give, section 170 is more likely to
provide a safe harbor because it insulates the corporation from any
inquiry regarding business connection under either state or federal tax
law. In fact, there is significant evidence that corporations generally
make charitable donations in furtherance of their business - either
37
38

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

See infra Part III.B.

Hollinger had corporate procedures in place, so the mere existence of such
procedures is clearly insufficient to prevent abuse.
39
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with respect to their employees, customers, or the communities in
which they operate. Most corporate charitable giving can easily fit
within the requirements of section 162's deduction for ordinary and
necessary business expenses. This is ironic because the strong
business flavor of most corporate giving should create a problem for
Section 170 requires that the
claiming a charitable deduction.
taxpayer claiming a deduction make a "contribution or gift," which
means that the payor has no expectation of return benefits. 40 At this
point, it seems purely historical that section 170 controls these

payments.
At the same time that corporate payments to charities look less

like "gifts," some ordinary business decisions appear to be quite
"philanthropic" because they sacrifice profits in the ordinary
41
operations of the business in order to satisfy moral or cultural norms.
donations as the
The traditional view of corporate charitable
• • 42
paradigm case of a profit-sacrificing decision has broken down as
greater attention focuses on• the
43 social issues raised by corporations'
Today, expenditures made in the
ordinary business operations.
ordinary course of operations might be less profit-maximizing than
payments made to charities." When a corporation chooses to operate

in a manner that costs more, but preserves the environment or
workers' jobs, the tax law treats those costs as ordinary and necessary
40 I.R.C. § 170(c). The regulation states:

Transfers of property to an organization described in section 170(c) which
bear a direct relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business and which are
made with a reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with
the amount of the transfer may constitute allowable deductions as trade or
business expenses rather than as charitable contributions. See section 162
and the regulations thereunder.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2005).
41 See generally Elhauge, supra note 32.
42 The basic corporations textbooks use it as a case study for ultra vires
D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY:
125-43 (5th ed. 2003); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 134-43 (9th ed., unabr. 2005).
41 See Brennen Jensen, Good Works Not Enough to Bolster Business Image,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug 4, 2005, at 20, 20 (reporting survey results in which
consumers expressed more concern about corporations treating their employees well
and less concern about donations to charity); Williams, supra note 31, at 1284-89.
Einer Elhauge concludes that corporate donations to charity are more likely
to increase corporate profits as compared to other agency-cost decisions that
managers make. See Elhauge, supra note 32, at 835-37. This makes the section 162
and section 170 dichotomy appear to be backwards.
activities. See, e.g.,

JEFFREY

MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
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business expenses, even if they were demonstrably unnecessary to the
production of business income. It is similarly insensitive to the profitmaximizing payments to charities.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "gift" implies something
given out of "detached and disinterested generosity. 4 5 Obviously, a
corporation never does anything with feelings of generosity. 46 But the
application of section 170 has finessed that problem by using a quid
pro quo analysis to determine whether there has been a gift. Thus, a
deduction is allowed under section 170 if the taxpayer gets no benefit

in return for the payment. For individuals, this makes a lot of sense.
The quid pro quo requirement operates to distinguish personal

consumption, which is taxable, from other reductions in a taxpayer's
resources that do not constitute consumption and therefore reflect
reductions in personal resources that do not need to be taxed. But a
taxable-consumption analysis is incoherent for corporations because
corporations never enjoy taxable consumption - all expenses should
be deductible for corporations. In computing the corporate tax, the
challenge is to identify nondeductible distributions, as opposed to
consumption. Thus, incorporation of the individual consumptionbased standard into the corporate realm is a poor fit. Section 170's

quid pro quo analysis authorizes a deduction for corporations only in
cases in which there is no benefit to the corporation, but the
corporation would also be entitled to a deduction, albeit under section
162, if it did receive a benefit. 8 The distinction in the corporate
45 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).

See also DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962) (imposing this requirement on
taxpayers claiming charitable contribution deductions).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d
522 (9th Cir. 1968). In
Transamerica,the court stated:
It does not seem appropriate, however, to demand of a corporate entity
such impulses as affection, respect or admiration. Further, an absolute
requirement of detached and disinterested generosity or lack of any
business purpose would tend to render ultra vires substantially all
charitable contributions and thus to frustrate the congressional intent that
corporations should enjoy such deductions.
Id. at 524. See Sugin, supra note 13, at 846-55, for a discussion of the personification
of the corporation in connection with the section 170 deduction.
47 See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts,
and Gefts" - The
Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a
Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 441, 495-512 (2003) (providing an overview of corporate charitable
deduction gift requirements).
48 The Joint Committee on Taxation explains that "a business transfer
made
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context is without a meaningful difference, even though that
difference is crucial for individuals. The absence of return benefit
might serve to distinguish the agency-cost situations that corporations
should best avoid from the profit-maximizing donations and,
incongruously, make them deductible.
But most corporate
philanthropy should fail a rigorous application of the quid pro quo
requirement precisely because the corporation does expect a benefit.
If the Internal Revenue Service (Service) decided to enforce that
requirement, we could expect many expenditures moving to the
section 162 column.
A further problem with the quid pro quo analysis is that it could
be applied to disallow deductions for many items that have long
seemed to fall squarely within section 162. Corporate managers have
discretion to choose more expensive methods for doing business over
less expensive ones, for whatever reason they determine is
appropriate because their decisions on business matters are protected
from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment rule. This is true for
simply foolish decisions that corporate managers make as well as
decisions made purposely to provide public benefits. For example, a
mining company might engage in more expensive shaft extraction,
rather than cheaper strip mining in order to preserve the environment,
even if there is demonstrably no difference in revenues that it would
make using one or the other method. While the extra cost for the
more environmentally responsible method is in the nature of
expenditures without corresponding return, there is no argument than
the extra cost is a section 170 expense, rather than a section 162
expense. But the impulse behind the decision is precisely the same as
giving the equivalent sum to an exempt organization that engages in
land reclamation or environmental preservation.
Similarly, some of the most salient issues in corporate
responsibility, such as living wages or health benefits, could also be in
the gray area between profit-maximizing and profit-sacrificing
behavior. The argument can surely be made that increased wages
translate into increased productivity. But that is not necessarily the
case.
If Wal-Mart increases its health insurance coverage for
employees in response to social pressure, the company is likely to be
with a reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of
the transfer is not deductible as a charitable contribution, but may be deductible
under section 162."
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS TO EXPAND FEDERAL

TAX INCENTIVES FOR CHARITABLE GIVING, at 5-6 (Joint Comm. Print 2001), available

at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-01.pdf.
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less profitable, not more.4 9 The ability to argue away the issue by
pointing to corporate benefits is precisely the same for both external
and internal philanthropic expenses.
There are two seemingly inconsistent trends in corporate
philanthropy. One powerful trend is a clear movement toward
"strategic philanthropy," in which corporations use charitable giving
as a mechanism for producing corporate benefits beyond marketing
and goodwill building.50 The other trend is toward segregation of
corporate giving into independent foundations that address the
agency-cost problems by formally separating corporate management
from philanthropic decisions.5 1 The strategic approach to corporate
giving makes it integral to the business of a corporation and virtually
indistinguishable from a wide range of other corporate investments,
but for the fact that nonprofit organizations carry out the operations.
Proponents of strategic philanthropy encourage corporations to create
synergistic relationships with nonprofit organizations that will inure to
both the short-term and long-term benefits of the corporation. They
claim that corporations can create the most social value in the
charitable context by harnessing the unique skills they have developed
conducting their businesses. For example, Cisco created the Cisco
Networking Academy, which teaches network administration to
secondary and post-secondary school students, particularly in needy
communities.
The program is a good example of strategic
philanthropy because it makes good use of Cisco's expertise to create
social benefits, prepares students for technology careers, and also
increases the demand for Cisco's products by developing the skills
that demand the type of products that Cisco makes. 2
Strategic philanthropy creates little trouble for corporate law. It
presents minimal agency-cost problems because it is integral to the
business and designed to maximize business benefits. 3 Because it
See Jason Furman, Wal-Mart: A Progressive Success Story (Nov. 28, 2005) (on
file with author), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/IE9245FE49A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2EO6EO3}/WALMARTPROGRESSIVE.PDF (stating that
if Wal-Mart expanded its health benefits or increased wages $5000 per employee, "it
would be virtually wiped out").
'0 See Porter & Kramer, supra note 2, at 57.
51 See James D. Werbel & Suzanne M. Carter, The CEO's Influence on
41

CorporateFoundation Giving, 40 J. Bus. ETHICS 47, 48 (2002).
12 See Porter & Kramer, supra note
2, at 64-65.
53 Michael Porter and Mark Kramer argue:
Moving to context-focused philanthropy will ... mean tightly integrating
the management of philanthropy with other company activities. Rather
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capitalizes on the unique expertise that a business possesses, the social
benefits are potentially much larger than they would be with other
kinds of corporate philanthropy, a factor that courts have found

important. 4 If Cisco simply donated its products, without teaching
people how to use them, the social value from its philanthropy would
be much lower than it is with the knowledge component attached."
Nevertheless, strategic philanthropy does create confusion in
the tax law because the Code requires that corporations separate

payments that are contributions from those that are business
expenses, whereas strategic philanthropy is about entwining those two
things in such a way that there is no principled distinction between
them. The Code encourages strict separation between payments that
are gifts and payments that are strategic, even though the business
literature has powerfully argued that the most social value is created
when that separation is abandoned 6 We do not have a rule that calls
all payments to exempt organizations "charitable." Fees for services
and product purchases from nonprofit organizations have never been
deductible under section 170.
The Code's classification is particularly problematic in a growing
area of strategic philanthropy - international giving. Companies

invest in health, education, and the environment in areas in which
they operate. Americans are becoming increasingly attuned to the
substantial needs for charities overseas, as evidenced by the
tremendous outpouring of support for victims of the 2004 tsunami. 7
than delegating philanthropy entirely to a public relations department or
the staff of a corporate foundation, the CEO must lead the entire
management team through a disciplined process to identify and implement
a corporate giving strategy focused on improving context.
Id. at 67.
54 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55 One problem with strategic philanthropy is that it may overlook the neediest,
who are likely to be too poor, sick, or old, to engage in the dynamic that mutually
benefits nonprofits and businesses. An understanding of corporate philanthropy that
recognizes its distinction from altruism should inform the law so that the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) better encourages individual giving and Congress provides
government funding where it is most needed.
56 See Betty S. Coffey & Jia Wang, Board Diversity and Managerial Control
as
Predictors of Corporate Social Performance, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 1595 (1998); Debbie
Thorne McAlister & Linda Ferrell, The Role of Strategic Philanthropyin Marketing
Strategy, 36 EUR. J. MARKETING 689 (2002); Porter & Kramer, supra note 2; Craig
Smith, The New CorporatePhilanthropy,HARV. Bus. REV., May 1994, at 105.
57 See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA FOUNDATION,
GIVING USA 2005, at 59 (2005) [hereinafter GIVING USA 2005] (stating that more
than one-third of American households contributed to tsunami relief and more
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Philanthropic investments overseas are subject to hurdles that straight
business investments do not face because section 170(c) only
authorizes a deduction for contributions to U.S. organizations and for
use within the United States.' 8
Even where it falls short of the ideal of strategic philanthropy,
business benefit is undoubtedly the prime driver of corporate giving.' 9
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that corporations give because

it affects customer preferences and increases their loyalty, it fosters
employee recruitment and retention, and the public expects it as a

normal part of business. 6° The business connection between
corporations and their philanthropy is borne out not only by what
Corporate charity
they say, but also by where they give.61
overwhelmingly supports projects that are related to either
employees, customers, or communities in which the business
62

operates. For example, the recipients of a pharmaceutical company's
generosity are health-related charities and science education, which

translates into benefits for the corporation because better health care
requires more medications and better science education creates more
qualified employees.

61

Microsoft provides "technology skills" all over

money was raised from Americans than for any other crisis, except the September 11
terrorist attacks).
58 Contributions that benefit overseas projects must go through a domestic
charity that reviews and approves the overseas project and retains control over the
funds. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48. See generally Robert Paine, The Tax
Treatment of InternationalPhilanthropyand Public Policy, 19 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2004).
59 See, e.g., DORIS RUBENSTEIN, THE GOOD CORPORATE CITIZEN: A PRACTICAL

GUIDE 11-15 (2004).
60 See Council on Foundations Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cof.org/
FAQDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=726 (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); see also, Ann D.
Getman & Martin Cohn, Corporate Philanthropy Comes of Age: The Benefits of
Doing Well by Doing Good (May 17, 2006), http://www.prarticlelibrary.com/
(describing how
NonProfitPhilanthropy/CorporatePhilanthropyComesofAge.htm
corporate giving inured to the benefit of various businesses).
61 For example, Wal-Mart's website, quoting Betsy Reithemeyer, vice president
for corporate affairs, states that, "[I]t has always been our goal to look for ways we
can help improve the local communities where our Company associates and
customers live ..." Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Total Charitable Giving for 2004 Exceeded $170M (Feb. 15, 2005),
http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/2332.aspx.
62 See Ian Wilhelm, Company Giving Habits Influence Workers, Consumers,
Two Studies Find,CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 28, 2004, at 12, 12.
63 See Merck & Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 25 (Mar. 17,
1997), for the Merck board's explanation of its charitable support for medical and
scientific education: "Training physicians and scientists benefits society as a whole,
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the world, creating demand for its products. 64 Retail companies would
be expected to appeal more to customers than companies that do not
face the public. So it is not surprising that connected to America's
S 65

biggest retailer is the country's most generous corporate foundation,
focusing its charitable efforts on two core stakeholders - customers
and employees.
Its largest program supports charities in the
communities in which its stores are based, matching fundraising by
organizations that hold their fundraising drives at its stores. 66 Those
fundraising drives undoubtedly affect immediate business at the
stores, in addition to producing more diffuse goodwill benefits. WalMart also supports charities favored by its employees, matching their
charitable contributions and donating money to the charities where
employees volunteer their time, 67 and it funds scholarships for
children of employees. 68 Similarly focusing on employee interests,
IBM gives over 75% of its philanthropy dollars to matching employee
while enhancing and broadening the pool of scientific talent that the Company may
draw upon for its employees." It also reported that approximately 80% of its
donations consisted of providing medicines that it manufactures. Id.; see also Pfizer
Found., Inc. 2003 Form 990-PF, http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2003/
136/083/2003-136083839-1-F.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (listing medical-related
recipients of corporate donations). Proxy statements are not required to include
information about charitable giving, but Merck included the information in response
to a shareholder proposal. See infra text accompanying note 125. While Form 990
does not give all information about recipients, foundations that support foreign
organizations include significant information on their tax returns pursuant to the
expenditure responsibility requirement in section 4945(h)(3).
See Microsoft Community Investment Programs, http://www.microsoft.com/
citizenship/giving/programs (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
61 See STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR.,

FOUNDATION YEARBOOK:

(2004), available
at http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/topfunders/top50giving.html (listing WalMart Foundation as the largest foundation by corporate giving). While Wal-Mart's
cash giving makes it the most generous corporation, a number of pharmaceutical
companies and Microsoft make greater total gifts in cash and products. See Wilhelm,
supra note 1, at 14.
66 See Community Support: Helping Local Organizations Through Community
Grants, http://www.walmartfoundation.org (follow "Community" hyperlink) (last
visited Aug. 21, 2006).
67 See
Grass Roots Giving: Our Community
Involvement Policy,
http://www.walmartfoundation.org (follow "What We Fund" hyperlink) (last visited
Aug. 21, 2006); Wal-Mart Found. 2003 Form 990-PF, http://www.guidestar.org/
FinDocuments/2004/716/107/2004-716107283-1-F.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
68 See 2006 Community Scholarships, http://www.walmartfoundation.org
(follow
"Education" hyperlink; then follow "Scholarships" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 21,
2006); see also Wal-Mart Found. 2003 Form 990-PF, supra note 67.
FACTS AND FIGURES ON PRIVATE AND COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 57
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Even without a specific connection to identifiable individuals, any
corporate sponsorship of a charitable event that identifies the
corporation and associates it with the charity contributes to the
corporation's reputation in the community.70 Although halo benefits
are not as concrete as the benefits associated with strategic
philanthropy, they can be important. It is not purely out of generosity
that Altria (which includes cigarette maker Phillip Morris) sponsors
such a visible array of charitable activities - the taint of cigarette
smoke may be removed by supporting the arts.7' The company
expects to derive goodwill in the community out of its activities, which
could prove very profitable even if customers are not directly affected
because a more positive perception of the company may prevent
increased governmental regulation or public mobilization against its
products or practices.
Considering this wide array of benefits to corporations in light of
the statutory standard for charitable giving, the interpretation of the
quid pro quo standard becomes important. It is clear that only some
of the benefits received by corporations flow directly from charitable
recipients. Others are benefits garnered from third parties associated
with the charities, the communities, and constituencies within the
companies themselves. One interpretation of the quid pro quo
standard that would argue for allowing deductibility of businessrelated philanthropy as a "gift" goes to the locus of origin of the
benefit. If the charity provides no benefit in return - directly in
exchange for the payment from the corporation - then it could be
argued that there is no quid pro quo. This would preserve the
charitable contribution deduction where the benefits come from
reputation in the community and good will from the corporation's
customers or employees. But there is no explicit requirement in the
7
quid pro quo interpretation that the benefit come from the charity. 1
69 See

Corporate

Giving:

Related

Charts,

http://www.philanthropy.com/
premium/articles/vl5/il9/19000801.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
70 See Knauer, supra note 6, at 57 (discussing the "halo effect").
71 The Altria website lists grant recipients and amounts. In 2004, for example,
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts received over $500,000. See Who We Fund,
http://www.altria.com/responsibility/4-9_1_2_whowefund.asp
(follow
"2004
Contributions: Arts" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
72 See Elrod v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1046 (1986) (denying
section 170
deduction for land transferred for use as a roadway because the roadway would
improve the value of the transferor's planned shopping center); Saba v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 (1980) (denying deduction for transfer of a
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The legislative history of the charitable deduction describes gifts as
amounts paid "with no expectation of a financial return
commensurate with the amount of the gift. '73 That language does not
limit itself to only the return from the charity. In one of the leading
cases, the court held that the plaintiff's interpretation of the quid pro
quo requirement as a "specific" and "direct" quid pro quo was "overly
restrictive."" In that case, the court held that below-market sales of
sewing machines to schools were not charitable gifts because the
purpose of the transfers was to create a future market for sewing
machines.7 5 The quid pro quo in that case came not from the recipient
of the machines (i.e., the schools), but from the recipient's
beneficiaries (i.e. the students). 76 In addition, the benefit was inchoate
at the time the company made the contributions, so the expectation of
benefit at some unidentified time in the future was sufficient to
undermine the deduction.
While courts have expressed some
discomfort in applying • the
test of detached and disinterested
17
generosity to corporations, in keeping with a focus on the intent of
the donor under Commissioner v. Duberstein," courts and
administrative decisions have disallowed deductions where donors
parcel to the state because transferor received other benefits on account of transfer);
Wolfe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970) (denying deduction for water and sewage
donated to village since the facilities increased the value of taxpayer's property); Rev.
Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65 (denying section 170 deduction where taxpayer paid an
amount to a fund administered by city, but expected benefits from tourists who would
come to the city). But see Morton v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 621 (1979)
(holding that transfer of property to a city for use in connection with the city's water
system constituted a charitable contribution in a situation where taxpayers intended
to benefit the general public and received nothing in return for the transfer).
13 S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 196
(1954).
14 Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 420 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
In Singer, the
court stated:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be received,
are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater than those that inure
to the general public from transfers for charitable purposes ... then in such
case we feel the transferor has received, or expects to receive, a quid pro
quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the realm of deductibility under
section 170.
Id. at 423.
75 Id.

It was not a particularly confident hope. The court was unmoved by Singer's
survey finding that only 1.75% of its retail customers were influenced in their
purchase by their school training. Id. at 424.
77 See id. at 420.
78 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
76
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gave under some sort of duress, even without a return benefit. 79 Thus,
the quid pro quo requirement of section 170 is a significant hurdle for
corporations.
An additional reason to move away from section 170 (and its quid
pro quo standard for deductibility) concerns the obligations that it
places on recipient organizations. The same standard that depends on
benefits received by the taxpayer claiming a deduction creates
burdens for charities that they would not have if corporations
deducted their payments under section 162. Under section 6115, a
charitable recipient is required to report to a donor the value of goods
and services furnished by the charity in return. 8° If the service the
charity provides consists of reputation burnishing or advertising that is
only available to charitable sponsors, that service - though real and
important - is very difficult to value. Even if the service costs the
charity nothing to provide, which will rarely be the case, it still may
have a significant value that would be relevant under both section
6115 and section 170(f)(8). The corporation seems to be in a much
better position than the charity to determine that value and the
section 170 deduction creates a tension between the corporation and
the organization because the corporation is inclined to encourage the
charity to understate the value so as to maximize the contribution.
That tension disappears where the deduction falls under section 162
because under that section a payer is generally presumed to get what
it paid for.
Finally, even if it were theoretically possible to distinguish profitseeking philanthropy from profit-sacrificing philanthropy, the
distinction between the two is nonjusticiable, so the distinction
between the sections in the current Code is not enforceable. The
Service and courts are ill-equipped to determine whether a particular
payment to a nonprofit institution is sufficiently related to the
corporation's business to qualify as a section 162 expense, or
alternatively, without sufficient expectation of a return benefit to
qualify for a deduction under section 170.81 As a practical matter,
'9 See United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (1968) (denying
charitable deduction for corporation acting under "economic duress and threatened
legal compulsion"); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311, 317 (1965) (denying
deduction where transfer made under compulsion of a challenged legal requirement);
Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93 (denying deduction under section 170 for amount
paid to charitable organization as a condition of probation and ordered by court).
80 Contributions of less than $75 are exempt from this obligation.
I.R.C.
§ 6115(a).
81 See Elhauge, supra note 32, at 834.
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corporations can describe their payments in whatever manner gives
them the tax treatment they prefer, rendering the distinction
meaningless.
D. FoundationBuilding
One of the most important trends in corporate philanthropy is the
rise of the corporate foundation. Many large corporations have
established separate charitable foundations that engage in grant
making. The section 170 deduction encourages corporations to
accumulate funds in private foundations because it authorizes an
immediate deduction in the year in which the funds are placed in the
foundation's coffers, even if the money is not paid out to ultimate
Well-advised corporations can
beneficiaries until later years.
contribute to their foundations in years in which their taxable income
is high and garner the greatest subsidy for that contribution. In years
in which the corporation has no taxable income or is taxed at a very
low rate, it can decline to place any money in the foundation. Thus,
contributions to corporate foundations can be managed to minimize a
corporation's tax liability over time.
One explanation for corporate foundations is that they are a
response to the agency-cost problem of corporate philanthropy:
foundations remove control from company management over giving
decisions and vest it in a separate board. 82 As discussed above, only
where corporate philanthropy is not strategic is it necessary to impose
safeguards to minimize agency costs because strategic philanthropy is
highly unlikely to create such costs. 83 Therefore, the trend toward
corporate foundations implicitly reflects two beliefs: (1) that corporate
philanthropy is not integral enough to the corporate business to
require significant participation by employees and officers of the
corporation and (2) that the benefits of separating the administration
of corporate philanthropy from other corporate operations outweigh
both the administrative costs of maintaining a separate foundation
and the loss of much of the synergy that charitable giving could create
for the business. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence does not
support a strong conclusion that corporate foundations reduce agency

This is not always true. Some corporations have overlap on the boards of the
foundation and the corporation. Even where the CEO is not on the foundation
board, the CEO seems to have influence on the foundation's decisions. See Werbel &
Carter, supra note 51, at 56-57.
83 See supra Part II.C.
82
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costs 84 and it is virtually impossible to distinguish philanthropy that is
good for business from agency-cost philanthropy."'
Therefore,
corporate foundations need to offer other benefits in order to justify
their costs.
Some of the issues relevant to corporate foundations are similar
to the issues concerning other private foundations, which are all more
highly regulated under the Code than are public charities. But in
some ways, corporate foundations present different policy questions
than other private foundations. It is worthwhile to consider whether it
is always appropriate to treat all foundations the same or whether
corporate foundations should be governed by their own set of rules. It
is not my task here to consider whether the rules for all private
foundations are warranted, but rather to think about whether
corporate foundations are properly categorized along with other
foundations, whatever the rules are for those foundations.
From the perspective of recipient charities, the intermediary role
that corporate foundations play between operating companies and
operating charities can be both good and bad. Charities benefit to the
extent that corporate foundations allow charitable recipients to rely
on a steady stream of support from benefactors that might be less
forthcoming directly from corporations.
Corporate giving is
responsive to ups and downs in the business cycle, increasing when
profits are up and decreasing as profits fall. 86 Because foundations
accumulate funds to be paid out to operating charities, they can buffer
charities from those swings by spreading grants evenly over time,
without concern for the profitability of the donor corporation. If
charitable recipients were subject to the vicissitudes of a corporation's
business and only received donations in profitable years, they would
be impeded in carrying on their work by the unreliability of corporate
support and their ability to achieve their charitable missions would be
more precarious. Corporate foundations allow bumpy contribution
levels from operating businesses to translate into steady streams of
support for nonprofit organizations.
But those advantages may come at a price to the charitable sector.
Corporate foundations might actually reduce total corporate funding
of charitable activities by creating incentives to accumulate large
84

See Werbel & Carter, supra note 51, at 48.

85 Id. at 56 ("[A]lthough

our results are supportive of an agency theory
perspective, the results are also compatible with stewardship theory." (i.e., a strategic
approach)).
See GIvING USA 2005, supra note 57, at 87.
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endowments. As long as corporate foundations have endowments,
those endowments can insulate the corporation from pressure to
continue contributing out of its current earnings. The generosity of a
corporation's founder or a past board might relieve the corporation of
any further impetus to give, reducing the total amount given over time
by corporations to charity.87
In 2003, the largest corporate
foundationm reported that it had assets worth over $453 million, but
89
made grants of only approximately $15 million.
It could continue
paying out at that rate for the next thirty years without contributing
another cent to the foundation or earning anything on the endowment
assets. Its tax return also indicated that the corporation donated only
$1 million to the foundation during 2003, 90 when it had $938 million in
income, 9 suggesting that the company felt little pressure to continue
funding the foundation. The corporate foundation may thus serve to
discourage payouts to charities and consequently minimize the public
pressure on operating corporations to pay in.
Nevertheless, even if the total amount devoted to charitable
purposes is not reduced on account of foundations, public benefit is
deferred when foundations are heavily endowed because operating
charities may have to wait a long time to receive the foundation's
invested assets. A low payout rate may be inconsistent with the
charitable deduction's policy of encouraging gifts to charities to
subsidize the works they do 9' and a foundation's large endowment
It is important to remember that corporations give a relatively small
percentage of income to charity. The corporate donor identified as giving the largest
income percentage to charity gave 2.86% of operating income in 2002. See id. at 96.
88 See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 65, at 60 (ranking corporate
foundations by
asset size, indicating Alcoa Foundation as the largest).
89 Alcoa Found. 2003 Form 990-PF, at 2, 10, http://www.guidestar.org/
FinDocuments/2003/251/128/2003-251128857-1-F.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
87

90 Id.
91 ALCOA INC.,

2003 ANNUAL

REPORT 64

(2004).

92 On the other hand, the subsidy may be equally effective for direct gifts
and

future gifts through foundations because the current expense is offset by either a
current charitable expenditure or a future grossed-up charitable expenditure of equal
present value. For example, a $100 contribution by a taxpayer in the 35% bracket
contains a $35 subsidy from the government. If the charity spends that money right
away, it can provide $100 of charitable services. If however it receives the money the
following year from a private foundation that received it in the initial year and
invested it at 10%, the $100 would have grown to $110 so that the charity would be
able to provide $110 of charitable services in the second year, increasing the value of
the subsidy from $35 to $38.50. The subsidy theory for the charitable deduction is the
most widely advanced. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 330 (2d ed. 1999).
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may produce agency costs within the grant-making organization,

diverting resources from charitable recipients to the foundation's
managers. 3 These are issues common to all foundations and deferral
may not be problematic for foundations generally. Michael Klausner
has argued that it is hard to know whether endowment building is
generally desirable because it is impossible to compare the social
benefits of expenditures made by charitable organizations today with
the expenditures they might make in the future - maybe generations
in the future.94 However, if current expenditures produce both
current and future benefits, then current payouts are desirable. 95

Thus, it is necessary to look at the types of charities that corporations
support to determine whether the law should encourage earlier
payouts to maximize social benefit. Because education is the leading
beneficiary of corporate charity, 96 earlier payouts would seem to be

desirable since current education may inure to the benefit of many
future generations.97 To the extent that corporate foundations
encourage corporations to wait, rather than immediately pay out to
the ultimate charitable recipients, they reduce social welfare.
The policies surrounding endowment preservation might be

different for corporate foundations than for other types of private
foundations, even though they are all subject to the same rules about
98
minimum required payouts. A private foundation endowed with the
wealth of a single individual is finite, along with the benefactor, and

the individual's death signals the last opportunity for contributions
from that individual.

Unless other donors arise, 99 the foundation's

Cf John E. Core et al., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in
Not-for-Profit Firms (Dec. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565241) (finding agency costs in operating nonprofits with
excess endowments, but note that study did not cover grant-making nonprofits).
See Michael Klausner, When Time Isn't Money: Foundation Payouts and the
Time Value of Money, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2003, at 51, 55-56.
95 See id. at
57.
96 See GIVING USA 2004, supra note 2, at 88 (citing
William 0. Brown, Jr. et al.,
Corporate PhilanthropicPractices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/joumal/09291199 (follow "Articles in Press"
hyperlink)); see also JOSEFINA ATIENZA & JENNIE ALTMAN, FOUND. CTR.,
93

FOUNDATION

GIVING

TRENDS:

UPDATE

ON

FUNDING

PRIORITIES

59

(2005)

("Compared to independent and community foundations, corporate foundations
devoted a larger share of their 2003 grant dollars to education (27.8 percent) .....
97 Klausner, supra note 94, at 57.
98 See I.R.C. § 4942.

This happens. Some private foundations eventually get broad enough support
to constitute public charities.
99
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payout policies determine the time frame for funding its purposes. If
the foundation is to support something in perpetuity, it needs to
protect its endowment in order to do so. It is therefore reasonable
that non-corporate foundations are allowed to pay out small enough
sums to ensure their continued existence. But corporate foundations
are in a very different position. Unlike a human philanthropist, the
funding corporation has an unlimited life and the potential to
continually invest new funds in charitable projects. Therefore, the
corporation does not need the endowed foundation to provide for
perpetual support of charitable purposes; it can choose to perpetually
support its favored charities by continuing to devote income to them.
This distinction between corporations and humans suggests that the
law might want to require greater payouts from corporate foundations
than other private foundations.
In balancing the volatility of
corporate contributions against the various policies favoring payouts,
corporate foundations might be required to annually pay out some
percentage more than just their income. A corporate foundation in
danger of going broke creates pressure for more contributions from its
operating benefactor.
In addition, foundation building by corporations is problematic,
given the business connection of most corporate giving. Foundation
building causes mismeasurement of corporate income by accelerating
deductions compared to the income those costs produce. The expense
that should matter for tax purposes takes place in the year in which
the foundation makes a payout to charity. But the section 170
deduction for contributions to corporate foundations recognizes the
movement of the cash from one corporate pocket to another, rather
than requiring that a deduction wait until the amount finds its ultimate
charitable recipient. In some ways, foundation funding resembles
retained earnings - they are both potentially available to further the
business in a variety of ways. The major difference is that retained
earnings may be paid out for corporate expenses or to shareholders as
dividends, while foundations may only pay amounts out to charities.
A more profit-oriented approach to corporate philanthropy
would be likely to strengthen the impulse to give. If we think of
corporate giving as a business expense, it is not the equivalent of other
tax-minimizing strategies that might have lower costs for the
corporation. Rather, it is comparable to other important costs of
doing business. In addition, a section 162 deduction would encourage
greater immediate gifts to operating organizations, rather than
moneyparking in corporate foundations, even by corporations without
taxable income. A section 162 deduction, unlike a section 170
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deduction, contributes to net operating losses (NOLs) that can be
carried both back and forward under section 172.'0°

Section 172

provides a more generous carryover regime than section 170, which
allows excess contributions to be carried forward only and fails to
increase NOLs. 1°
Finally, focusing on the tax-minimizing function of corporate
foundation building highlights its fragility in the face of other, more
aggressive and profitable schemes for minimizing corporate tax. To

the extent the corporation has deductions available to it that do not
require the outlay of cash, as is necessary pursuant to the "payment"
requirement under section 170, those other strategies are more
attractive. For example, the perfectly legal strategy of investing in
capital equipment eligible for the bonus depreciation rules adopted in
2001 and expanded in 2003 can create a negative rate of tax on the

corporation's income.102 If a corporation is managing its tax liability,
those deductions are more desirable than the deduction under section
170. As corporations find new and more advantageous ways to

minimize their tax liability, the tax benefits of charitable giving under
section 170 pale in comparison. The recipients of corporate charity
are the victims of this strategy.103
E. In-Kind Gifts
Under current law, corporations have an incentive to give certain
in-kind donations to charities and a substantial percentage of
corporate giving is in-kind.'0
Donations of property made by
corporations are sometimes privileged under the Code, compared to
100Net operating losses, to which section 162 deductions contribute, can be

carried back two years and forward twenty years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1).
101 Excess charitable contributions by corporations cannot be carried back at all,
can only be carried forward five years, and can never exceed the 10% limitation in
any year, regardless of carryovers. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2), (d)(2). Thus, the treatment of
section 162 deductions is much more generous than the treatment of section 170
deductions.
102 See Calvin H. Johnson, Depreciation Policy During
Carnival: The New 50
PercentBonus Depreciation,100 TAx NOTES 713, 713-14 (Aug. 4, 2003).
103 Charities are also likely to be the unintended victims of estate tax repeal and
other options for tax reform. See Evelyn Brody, Charitiesin Tax Reform: Threats to
Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 689-90 (1999).
104 See
CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY
AT IND. UNIv, AAFRC TRUST FOR
USA 2003, at 99 (2003) [hereinafter GIVING USA 2003]
(reporting that as much as one-third of corporate contributions in 2002 were given inkind).
PHILANTHROPY, GIVING
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both (1) donations of cash by corporations and (2) contributions of
similar property by individuals. Under section 170, the deduction for
contributions of ordinary income property is generally limited to the
donor's basis in that property,'05 a rule that prevents deductions
exceeding income with respect to the property. But corporations can
deduct more than basis under section 170(e)(3) for inventory property
if the property will be used by the charity to care for the poor, sick, or
children. °9 Corporations also have uniquely generous rules if they
donate scientific equipment that they make to organizations for
scientific research or computer technology to schools.' 7 These special
rules mean that corporations can deduct amounts that have never
previously been included in income, making these contributions more
attractive than equal-value contributions of cash. In addition, by their
terms, these increased deductions are available only to C
corporations, so that individuals and S corporations receive less
government subsidy for these types of contributions than do C
corporations donating the same items.'08
of property
While the preference for charitable contributions
S •
109
compared to cash is an important broader tax policy issue, I focus on
the narrower concern of these special preferences for certain
corporate transfers. While Congress may have legitimately wanted to
encourage gifts of particular types of property - such as food for the
poor and computers for schools - there seems to be no explanation
for favoring contributions of these types from corporations compared
In extending the enhanced deduction for
to other taxpayers.
legislative history states that schools and
the
computer equipment,
libraries need computer equipment. ° But it is not clear that Congress
105 I.R.C.

§ 170(e)(1).

Corporations can deduct the basis, plus half the unrealized profit inherent in
the property, but the deduction may not be more than twice the corporation's basis.
I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(B).
107 I.R.C. § 170(e)(4), (6).
For contributions in 2005, the corporate-donor
108 I.R.C. § 170(a)(3)(A).
limitation for food contributions was abrogated, but non-corporate taxpayers still had
to make the contribution from a trade or business and were limited to deductions of
10% of trade or business income. See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 305, 119 Stat. 2016, 2025.
109 Taxpayers can generally deduct the full fair market value of capital gain
property, even though the built-in gain has not been included in income. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c) (2005). For an excellent treatment of the larger issue, see Daniel
106

Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of

Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002).

"0 See

STAFF OF

JOINT

COMM.

ON TAXATION,

109TH
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has identified the most desired property by the neediest organizations
and Congress does not seem to be in the best position to determine
what items organizations need most. There is little reason why the
law should encourage corporations to give property rather than cash
to charity because the charitable organization can better determine
the goods it needs to carry out its purposes. Cash, of course, gives the
organizations more power and discretion to decide that for
themselves.
Pharmaceutical companies top the list of in-kind donations and
such donations propel them to the top of the list of biggest corporate
givers. Their generosity is appropriately encouraged because their
contributions of medicines are crucial to the well-being of the sick and
poor in this country and around the world. Thus, the question for the
deduction of in-kind pharmaceuticals is not the simplistic one of
whether drug companies should be encouraged to provide free or lowcost medicine, but rather whether it makes sense to provide the
encouragement in the form that the Code currently contains. The
deduction enjoyed by drug companies is real (as long as the
companies can use it), which means that the government is paying for
that subsidy. When analyzed from the perspective of classic tax
expenditure analysis - by looking at whether the government subsidy
is in the most efficient and equitable form - the encouragement that
the Code provides to drug companies to contribute free or low-cost
drugs becomes less compelling. Under the current regime, drug
companies can determine for themselves how much to give, who
receives the drugs, and how to design the program, even though the
contributions are government-subsidized. These are all important
public health decisions that might be better made by public health
professionals than by drug companies answerable to shareholders and
operating in a competitive economic environment. They might also
be better made by charitable organizations that would choose food
over medicine, or particular drugs compared to others, if they had
money instead of products.
Because the public health concerns are substantial, the lack of
governmental control that characterizes the charitable deduction is
worrisome in this context. In fact, the statute seems to reflect
inconsistent policies by circumscribing the terms of the contributions
eligible for the deduction,"' but maintaining the form of a section 170
at 138 (Joint
Comm.
Print
2005),
available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=2005.joint committee on taxation&docid=f:21118.pdf.
III There are an unusual number of requirements for the deduction
of inventory
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS,
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deduction, which cedes control over the allocation of government
resources to taxpayers. When drug companies go through a difficult
business period, we need to worry that the availability of medicine for
the poor will decline. In addition, the medicines manufactured by
different companies are not all in equal demand by needy people.
Why should the availability of particular drugs to the poor depend on
the tax rates paid by different drug companies? Profitable companies
receive the greatest tax benefit and therefore the incentive in the law
is minimal or nonexistent for newer or less profitable drug companies,
even though they may have drugs that would best address a public
health concern.
The rule for contributions of inventory property gives drug
companies a substantial windfall by allowing deductions equal to as
much as twice the company's real cost for the contributed property,
while requiring an adjustment to its cost of goods sold by only the
actual basis. For example, a contribution of $1000 worth of drugs in
which the company had a $100 basis would produce a $200 deduction
for the company and a $100 reduction in cost of goods sold. This is a
windfall $100 deduction, equivalent to a cash transfer from the
government to the company equal to $100 multiplied by the
company's marginal rate of tax.! 2 The provision is designed so that
the donor of inventory property can never be in a better after-tax
position than it would be in if it had sold the property,113 but it is
nevertheless designed to allow the donor to be in a better after-tax
position than it would have been in if it had donated money. A
comparison to a donation of money seems more relevant than the
comparison to a sale in the ordinary course of business.
Property donations create other problems that suggest the
Code should not favor them over cash. Valuation is always difficult
for in-kind contributions and donors have a tendency to inflate the
property: the property must be used by the donee in its exempt purpose and only for
the care of the ill, needy or infants, the donee may not transfer the property for
consideration, and the donee must provide a written statement representing
compliance with these requirements. I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A).
112 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c)(1) (1994). If the basis were higher compared
to the
value of the property, the deduction might not equal twice basis, but it could
constitute a substantial windfall. For example, if the basis were $600 and the value
$1000, the deduction would be $800 and the reduction in cost of goods sold $600. Id.;
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(d) ex. 2. This example gives the company a $200 windfall
deduction, even larger than the low-basis example.
113 See S. REP. No. 94-938(11), at 78-79 (1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4029, 4103 (explaining reasons for provision adopted in Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520).
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value of their contributions to maximize their deductions., 4 When
this occurs, the loss to the fisc may be greater than the public benefit
provided through the charity's receipt of the property."5 In addition,
the incentive for corporations to give certain kinds of inventory
property may be a waste of government resources because it rewards
corporations for giving away their obsolete or unprofitable products,
which might have been donated anyway and may not be of much use
to the recipients.! 6 The Code's provisions also favor corporations
with certain kinds of property, while other businesses without the
favored property might provide as valuable or more crucial support
for charities.
Substitution of a section 162 deduction for the section 170
deduction would remove the incentive to give inventory, increasing
the likelihood that a corporation would donate cash or goods more
specifically desired by the recipient organization. That shift would
also improve the coherence of the tax law because it would moot the
current law's allowance of a deduction where there has been no
income previously included. Section 170's deduction for what
amounts to untaxed profit is an unwarranted extra tax-based subsidy
available to a very small subset of taxpayers making certain types of
gifts. There does not seem to be any compelling reason to allow that
windfall and application of section 162 would end it.

114

In 2004, Congress curtailed some of what it perceived as the worst abuses of

the fair market value rule by limiting certain deductions. For example, donated cars
can only be claimed as deductions to the extent that the charitable recipients receive
value on their sale. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §
884(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1632-34 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(f)(12)).
Nevertheless, abuses continue. See Marc Kaufman, Big-Game Hunting Brings Big
Tax Breaks: Trophy Donations Raise Questions in Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
2005, at Al.
115 The more general argument made in the literature against the
fair market
value deduction is just as compelling for corporations as for individuals. See
discussion of possible reforms to rules for charitable contributions of property in
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX

at 293-307 (Joint Comm. Print
2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
16 For example, City Harvest collects food donations
from many organizations
that cannot use a tax deduction (or the food, apparently). See City Harvest 2004
Annual Report: Food Donors, http://www.cityharvest.org/about/annual/food.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (listing donors, which include many nonprofit
organizations).
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES,

HeinOnline -- 26 Va. Tax Rev. 160 2006-2007

2006]

EncouragingCorporateCharity
III. THE BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY MODEL

A. Addressing Bias and Agency Costs
For many years, Berkshire Hathaway had a much-admired system
for corporate philanthropy that allowed shareholders to designate the
charitable organizations that would receive corporate contributions.
It brilliantly addressed both the bias issue and the agency-cost issue.
On the bias issue, it maximized the federal subsidy by having the
payment to charity and the consequent deduction at the corporate
level; there was no dividend to shareholders that would increase the
tax bite. On the agency-cost issue, it avoided abuse by managers using
the corporation's money to support their favorite organizations by
allowing the shareholders to designate charities. Although the
corporation decided the total level of charitable giving (and
shareholders could not opt to receive dividends in lieu of designating
charities), the system gave shareholders the maximum possible control
over corporate giving.
Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway's
legendary chairman, recognized that corporate philanthropy was
really an expenditure that came out of the pockets of the
shareholders. In one of his letters to shareholders, he wrote:
When A takes money from B to give to C and A is a
legislator, the process is called taxation. But when A is an
officer or director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy.
We continue to believe that contributions, aside from those
with quite clear direct benefits to the company, should reflect
the charitable preferences
of owners rather than those of
17
officers or directors.'
The academic literature applauded the Berkshire Hathaway
approach - Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell's article on corporate
philanthropy
was essentially a brief in favor of Berkshire Hathaway's
118
program.
They endorsed the approach so strongly that they
suggested adoption of a tax rule that would mandate the practice by
permitting corporate deductions only for charitable gifts designated
by shareholders." 9 They believed that the program struck the

117

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC.,

1987

ANNUAL REPORT

3 (1988), available at

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1987htm.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
118 See Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, CorporateCharitable Giving, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1191 (2002).
"9
See id. at 1209.
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appropriate balance by allowing managerial discretion over how much
to set aside for philanthropy, while limiting the agency costs and
promoting philanthropic values. Almost all of Berkshire Hathaway's
shareholders were sufficiently interested in the program to
participate. 20
Nevertheless, even before Berkshire Hathaway
discontinued its program, it was apparently a failure as a model for
corporate charitable giving.121 Shareholders at a few other companies
presented shareholder proposals to be included in the companies'
proxy statements, in the hopes of emulating it.122 Consistent with
Berkshire Hathaway's approach, the uniqueness of corporate
charitable giving led the SEC Office of Chief Counsel to conclude that
proposals concerning shareholder-designation programs could not be
excluded from proxy statements under Rule 14a-8 as ordinary
23
business within the exclusive control of managers, not shareholders.1
124
Despite the SEC's position, management opposed them and all the

120

The 2002 Annual Report reported that 97.3% of eligible shares participated in

the program. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2003)
[hereinafter BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT].
1
Corporations with larger numbers of shareholders with smaller holdings
would face greater administrative problems than Berkshire Hathaway encountered.
See Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 118, at 1217-18.
122 Shareholder proposals to adopt a Berkshire Hathaway-type plan were
presented at Merck in 1996, Union Pacific in 1991 and 1993, and New England
Electric System in 1992 and 1993. See Merck & Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A), at 26-27 (Mar. 18, 1996); Union Pacific Corp., Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A), at 45-46 (Mar. 23, 1993); Union Pacific Corp., Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A), at 29-31 (May 31, 1991); New England Elec. Sys., Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A), at 13-14 (Mar. 26, 1992). A proposal was also presented by a Citigroup
shareholder in 2000 that resembled the shareholder-designation program. Citigroup
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 253, at *3-4 (Feb. 29, 2000).
123 See Citigroup Inc., supra note 122, at *1; AT&T Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 224, at *1-2 (Feb. 17, 2000) (stating that charitable
contributions "involve a matter of basic corporate policy which is extraordinary in
nature").
124See Union Pacific Corp, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
158 (Feb. 5, 1993); Union Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 126 (Jan. 24, 1991). In the former letter, the SEC stated:
[I]t is the staff's view that a decision regarding the allocation of Company
funds, the amount of which has been determined by the Board, among
charitable donees, would appear to deal with a matter of basic corporate
policy which is extraordinary in nature and beyond the Company's ordinary
business operations.
Id. at *1.
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proposals failed."' Thus, despite its academic stature as a model
program, it never became policy at any other corporation.
The failure of the Berkshire Hathaway model to spread
throughout the corporate world may be the result of administrative
challenges that corporations face in adopting such a program, rather
than rejection of the underlying belief that the corporation gives away
the shareholders' money. After all, many corporations have smaller
value shares and many more shareholders than Berkshire Hathaway.
But rejection of shareholder designation by other companies may
signal rejection of Buffet's perspective on corporate philanthropy. He
perceived corporate charitable giving as wealth transfers out of the
corporation and for certain types of corporations, such as holding
1 26
companies, this might be the most reasonable way to understand it.
But other companies accurately perceive it as a crucial part of the
business.
Consider the following managerial response to the
shareholder proposal presented in Merck's 1997 Proxy Statement:
The Company's charitable endeavors, encompassing
contributions made directly by the Company and those made
through The Merck Company Foundation, are the product of
a carefully administered program designed to ensure that the
nature and magnitude of the contributions are in the best
interests of the Company and its stockholders and that the
recipients are appropriate and deserving.... The Company's
charitable endeavors ... earn the Company substantialrespect
and good will from the scientific community, local
communities in the vicinity of our sites, customers and the
127
public at large.
A skeptical reader might consider these justifications a
smokescreen for managers wanting to retain the power of this
128
perquisite.
But the explicit connection to corporate business in the
125

The Merck proposal received only 3% shareholder support. See Merck &

Co., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 8 (Aug. 13, 1997).
126 Berkshire Hathaway's operating subsidiaries engage in the traditional model
of corporate giving and continue to do so despite cessation of the shareholderdesignation program.
127 Merck & Co., Inc., Proxy Statement, supra
note 63, at 25 (emphasis added).
128 The Merck board also argued that the administrative burden
would be too
great because it would require the company to communicate with shareholders who
held their shares in street name. Id. Berkshire Hathaway overcame this problem by
making such shares ineligible for participation in the program. See BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 22. Of course, as the number
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stated rationale for retained control by management should then act
as a constraint on their later discretion. For proponents of strategic
philanthropy, discussed above," 9 it is incoherent to give shareholders a
voice in determining where the money goes.
Whether or not the corporate managers were accurately
describing their company's philanthropic activities, in their defense of
the corporation's prerogative, they undermined the legal justification
of continued application of section 170 to corporations. If corporate
giving is in fact as corporations describe it in their SEC filings, then
Buffet was wrong in his characterization and section 162 is
appropriate and sufficient to cover it. In addition, changing the tax
characterization of these types of expenses should translate into
ordinary business treatment for state corporate law and federal
securities law and open managers to state-law claims of waste if they
fail to spend the corporation's funds in furtherance of its business.
B. The Demise of ShareholderDesignation
At the same time that Congress was considering repeal of the tax
that individuals pay on dividends received, Berkshire Hathaway
abruptly discontinued its shareholder-designation program. It did not
connect its decision to the possibility of dividend-tax repeal, even
though such repeal would have fundamentally changed the calculus
for corporate giving. If full dividend repeal had taken place, the bias
in favor of corporate giving would have completely disappeared and it
would have been more likely in individual cases that shareholder
giving out of dividends received would have been a more tax-efficient
strategy.
Consider the consequences of full repeal compared to partial
repeal, returning to the running example discussed in the analysis of
bias above."3 Everything at the corporate level remains the same
because exempting dividends would do nothing to change the
imposition of the corporate level tax. So $100 corporate earnings
would produce a $100 gift to charity. If the corporation pays tax at
35%, the shareholders receive $65, both pre- and post-tax. If the
individual shareholders are subject to a 35% rate of tax also, they can
make a contribution of $100, the same as the corporation. As
described above, this is because the deduction at the shareholder level
allows the shareholder to gross up the cash she has available by the
of shareholders increases, the administrative costs of the program increase as well.
129See supra Part II.C.
130 See supra Part II.A.
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tax savings on her other income produced by the deduction. This is
where there is no bias - where the shareholders and corporation
have the same rate of tax and corporations can make tax-free
distributions to shareholders. The amount of the contribution will be
the same for the corporation and the shareholders. 3 ' This is
illustrated as Example 1 in the chart below.
Extending the illustration from above in which the shareholder
has a higher rate of tax than the corporation, an $85 distribution
(assuming $100 earnings at 15%) would produce a $131 contribution
at the individual level.132 This is illustrated as Example 2 in the chart
below. Example 3 reflects a corporate rate of zero."' Examples 2 and
3 are more advantageous if the gift is made at the shareholder level.
Thus, with full repeal of the dividend tax, the likelihood of greater tax
savings from shareholder giving is higher than under current law,
where there is a reduced rate, but dividends remain taxable,
effectively imposing a toll charge on the transfer to shareholders.

Example 1
35%

2.
Example 2
15%

Example 3
0%

35%

35%

35%

$100
$100_$_00_$10
$100*

$100

$100

$100

$100

$65
$65

$85
$85_$100

$100

$100

$131

$14
$154

ILLUSTRATION

Corporate
Rate
Individual
Rate
Dividend
Rate
Corporate
Earnings
Corporate
Gift
Individual
Income
Individual
Gift

$10I_$13

*The optimal gifts are in bold. Figures have been rounded.

Thus, it would have been reasonable for Berkshire Hathaway to
discontinue its shareholder-designation program as it was no longer
As described above, the shareholder contribution can be the dividend
received divided by one minus the tax rate. In this example, $65/0.65 = $100. This
formula will always produce a contribution greater than the dividend itself as long as
the shareholder has taxable income and a positive tax rate.
132 85/(1 - 0.35) = 130.7.
133 To compute the individual gift amount:
100/(1 - 0.35) = 153.85.
131

HeinOnline -- 26 Va. Tax Rev. 165 2006-2007

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:125

the most efficient tax strategy. If shareholder designation was a clever
way to take advantage of the bias, then repeal - and even reduction
- of the dividend tax negates that purpose. But it does not seem that
the company acted in response to this proposed legislative change
because it stated that it was giving up "some minor tax efficiencies" in
discontinuing the program.14
In fact, Berkshire Hathaway's discontinuation of the program
seems to have had nothing to do with shareholders at all. Rather, a
boycott had been instituted against its subsidiary, Pampered Chef, to
challenge the corporation's contributions to Planned Parenthood,
which had been designated by some shareholders under the program.
The individual associates of Pampered Chef, who rely on relationship
sales, suffered on account of the program and the company
terminated it to protect their livelihood.
The incident was not just an unfortunate example of reproductive
politics undermining good corporate governance; it was an indictment
of the construct for corporate philanthropy that Berkshire Hathaway
had built. Apparently, the device of giving shareholders the power to
designate charities of their choice failed to spare the company - or
the independent contractors who worked with it, but were not even
employees of the company - public judgment for those choices. The
company was deemed connected to the organizations that its money
supported, despite the fact that management had carefully divested
itself of control over funding decisions. The public did not believe that
the company's owners were deciding what to do with their money; it
treated the company as though it were spending its money.
Ultimately, the shareholder-designation program should be
considered a failure because it did not fully understand the problem
that it was designed to solve. The program may have addressed the
agency-cost issue from the perspective of the corporation's
shareholders, but it did not succeed in doing so from the perspective
of other constituencies important to the corporation. The customers
were oblivious to the separation that the corporation had created
between the corporate business and its charitable giving and perceived
it as invested in Planned Parenthood. This occured despite the fact
that churches were the most frequent designees 135 and that 3500
116
charities a year had received contributions under the program.
134 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.,

2003

ANNUAL REPORT

2003 ANNUAL REPORT].
Id. at 21.
Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. News Release (July 3, 2003),

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
135
136

3, 22 (2004) [hereinafter
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What the Pampered Chef fiasco should have taught corporations
is that their charitable giving cannot be isolated from their businesses
and cannot be carved out as something in the domain of shareholders
because it is their money to spend. Consistent with its commitment to
allow the shareholders to spend their own money on philanthropy,
when it discontinued the shareholder-designation program, Berkshire
Hathaway ceased all charitable giving.137 If it could not adopt the
model of business-benefit philanthropy, it was the only reasonable
thing it could do.
IV. WHAT CHANGES IN REPLACING SECTION 170 WITH SECTION
162?
This article has so far argued that switching the treatment of
corporate philanthropy from section 170 to section 162 would
eliminate the bias created by section 170, reduce agency costs by
legitimating business-related donations, reduce reliance on corporate
foundations, remove the preference for gifts of certain kinds of
inventory, and refine the legal landscape to make it more consistent
with public perception and the tax treatment of corporations. This
section considers some of the consequences that arise from that
switch.
A. Corporationsand Their Employees
A substantial portion of corporate giving is employee-related,
including matching grants and a broad array of public-benefit
expenditures in the communities where the corporation's employees
are located. Compensation-related giving should be immediately
deductible under section 162. If the services are performed in the year
in which the contribution is made and the compensation for the
underlying services is immediately deductible, there is no need to
capitalize the related charitable payment. Even if the services relate
to the creation of an asset with a long useful life, the regulations under
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/jul0303.pdf.
137 Acquired subsidiaries continued to make charitable donations as they had
prior to their acquisition, but for what would be, for a public company, agency-cost
type contributions that those subsidiaries had previously made on behalf of prior
owners. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 22. It
is interesting to note that the charitable donations made by subsidiaries in 2002
amounted to $20 million in cash and $4 million in-kind, significantly more than the
$16.5 million donated through the shareholder-designation program. See BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 21-22.
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section 263 are very generous in allowing an immediate deduction for
compensation and do not require capitalization of compensation
expenses as long
as the services facilitated the creation of an
38
asset.1
intangible
Employee matching grants"' produce an additional concern
because characterizing them as compensation raises tax issues for the
employees, as well as the corporate payor. In an earlier article, I
suggested that employee matching grants should be taxed as both
compensation to employees and contributions by them, producing
both income and a deduction for employees who designate matching
grants.' 40 This two-step treatment fully follows through on the
compensation model, but is troubling as a practical matter because the
limitations on charitable deductions could result in income for
employees without any offsetting deduction, most likely because
employees who do not itemize are not entitled to any deduction under
section 170.141
This problem arises because of the generally inequitable
treatment of charitable contributions made by low-income taxpayers.
In order to avoid imposing a tax on employees on account of their
employer's matching funds, Congress could address the larger
problem of deductibility for contributions made by low-income
taxpayers by allowing an above-the-line deduction for charitable
contributions. 4 2 The specific case of employer matching grants offers
Congress more technical flexibility because it can either address the
concern on the income side or the deduction side. While a fix on the
138 Treas. Reg.

§ 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)

(2004); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)4(b)(3)(iii) ("Amounts paid in performing services under an agreement are treated as
amounts that do not create a separate and distinct intangible asset within the meaning
of this paragraph (b)(3), regardless of whether the amounts result in the creation of
an income stream under the agreement.").
139 They are a major element of corporate giving. A study of corporate
giving in
St. Louis found that 20% of surveyed firms had matching grant programs for their
employees. GATEWAY TO GIVING, PRIVATE DOLLARS FOR PUBLIC GOOD: A REPORT
ON
GIVING
IN
THE
ST.
Louis
REGION
9
(2004),
available at
http://www.gatewaytogiving.org/PrivateDollars-forPublicGood-Report.pdf.
140 See Sugin, supra note
13, at 874-76.
141 There are currently proposals to change this rule. See Tax Relief Act of 2005,
S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 301 (as passed by Senate, Nov. 17, 2005), which allows
nonitemizers to deduct contributions in excess of a floor. The proposal is somewhat
controversial. See Fred Stokeld, Charitable Deduction Provision in Tax Relief Bill
Stirs Debate 2006 TNT 5-4 (Jan. 9, 2006).
142 The proposal in S. 2020 would be more expensive, but less controversial, if
it
did not contain the floor for both itemizers and nonitemizers.
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deduction side would be preferable because it would address the
general inequity, this specific problem could be addressed by adding
matching contributions to the considerable list of excluded employee
fringe benefits already in the Code.14' Along the lines of the exclusion
allowed for working-condition fringe benefits, a payment by an
employer to a charitable organization under a matching gift program
could be excluded by the employee if such payment would have been
deductible under section 170 if the employee had made the payment
herself. Just as the exclusion for working-condition fringes ignores
collateral limitations that might reduce or eliminate the value of the
deduction, such an exclusion could be designed to ignore the equally
irrelevant question of whether the employee itemizes deductions.
In Notice 2005-68, the Service endorsed a temporary "leave-based
donation" program under which employees may exchange unused
vacation, sick, or leave days for their employer's cash donations to
charities helping Hurricane Katrina victims.' 44 The Service announced
that the employees would not be required to include the wages they
did not actually receive and the employer would not be limited to a
deduction under section 170 for payments to the charities. The Notice
is interesting because it acknowledges that the contributions to charity
paid by the employer are really contributions by the employees of
wage income that they would otherwise have received from the
employer. The tax treatment of that transaction - without the Notice
-- would require compensation inclusion and a corresponding
charitable deduction by the employee. By allowing an exclusion, the
Notice ameliorates the problem with the two-part approach for
employees who do not itemize deductions or whose deductions are
subject to the percentage limitation in section 170(b). Under the twopart approach, the employer's treatment would be a straight section
162 deduction for compensation paid and section 170 would not be
relevant. But under the Notice, it appears that the employer can
choose to deduct the amounts under either section 162 or section 170,
contrary to the general proscription contained in section 162(b).145
143

See I.R.C. §§ 105,106, 119, 125,127, 129, 132, 137.

144I.R.S. Notice 2005-68, 2005-40 I.R.B. 622.
145The Notice states: "The Service will not assert that an employer will be only

permitted to deduct these cash payments under the rules of § 170 rather than the rules
of § 162." Id. Section 162(b) provides: "No deduction shall be allowed under
subsection (a) for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction
under section 170 were it not for the percentage limitations, the dollar limitations, or
the requirements as to the time of payment, set forth in such section." I.R.C.
§ 162(b).
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Employee matching grants are distinguishable from leave-based
donation programs because the foregone income in the vacation-gift
program has clearly already been earned by employees at the time
they decide to redirect it to charity, making constructive receipt
compelling. 46 The two-step analysis is less transparent in the
matching gift program because constructive receipt of employee
compensation would not apply. 47 It is also harder to identify the
compensatory nature of the matching gift since the employee never
has the right to take the matching grant for personal use and the
employer could terminate the program without having accrued any
obligations to employees. But that perspective is too restrictive a view
of what matching-gift programs are. They exist as a global employee
benefit, rather than as a particular element of individual
compensation that is received by only some employees, such as
performance bonuses. In recognition of the collective benefit they
provide, it may be appropriate to allow their exclusion to designating
individuals. Even if considered a shared benefit among employees,
matching gifts more clearly reflect the charitable preferences of
employees than employers and reward a combination of employee
services for the employer and individual charitable giving by
employees.
B. Timing
The choice between section 162 and section 170 is particularly
important for timing the deduction. In some cases, a deduction under
section 162 would be prior to the corresponding deduction under
section 170, and in other cases, the order would be reversed. This is
due to the limitations particular to each section. Under section 170,
the timing of the deduction generally depends on the year in which
payment is made, without regard to the matching concept of accrual
accounting. 14 Accrual method taxpayers may deduct contributions
prior to payment only if an election is made and payment is completed
before the fifteenth day of the third month following the year in which
it is authorized.9 This requirement may delay a deduction for an
See Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953) (allowing taxpayers
to defer income without constructive receipt where agreement to defer was made
before any amounts were due); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
146

147

See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979).

148

Section 170(a) requires generally that payment must be within the taxable

year.
149

I.R.C. § 170(a)(2).
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accrual-method taxpayer compared to section 162, under which a
deduction is allowed when the all events test is satisfied and economic

performance

has occurred,

even

if that precedes payment.

Alternatively, a deduction under section 170 will precede the
deduction under section 162 if the business deduction would be
The
subject to the capitalization requirement of section 263.'

capitalization requirement trumps an immediate deduction pursuant
to section 162 when an expenditure gives rise to a benefit that lasts for
an extended period of time.

One explanation for the section 170 deduction for corporations
may be that Congress wanted to dispense with the capitalization
requirement as a way to encourage corporate philanthropy. The
capitalization requirement only makes sense in the context of a

section 162 analysis for expenditures incurred in pursuit of profit
because capitalization is an attempt to match income with the
expenses incurred to produce that income. Since a charitable gift
deductible under section 170 is presumed not to be profit producing
under the quid pro quo analysis, the matching of income with
expenses is inapposite under that section. Therefore, the "payment"

rule in section 170, which is not subject to override by the
capitalization requirement, allows a more accelerated deduction than
would the combined application of section 162 and section 263.
Allowing corporations to bypass the capitalization requirement
and increase the federal subsidy for their payments to charitable
organizations may once have been a legitimate reason to retain the

section 170 deduction for corporations.
150

But this reason is much less

In some cases, the economic performance required would be payment,

mirroring the basic rule in section 170, but section 461(h) contemplates economic
performance prior to payment in many cases. For example, if we determine that a
corporation is entitled to a section 162 deduction for an employee matching grant as a
matter of employee compensation under section 162, then economic performance
would occur in the year in which the employee performs the services, even if the
matching grant is actually paid out in a subsequent year. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A).
151 See Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 504, 515 (N.D.
Cal.
1966) (rejecting taxpayer's section 170 deduction and requiring capitalization of
expenditure); Sugin, supra note 13, at 845 n.53.
152 Accelerating the deduction for a capital asset in excess of
its economic
depreciation reduces the rate of tax on income from the asset. Expensing in the year
of acquisition, as under a cash flow consumption tax, exempts the income from the
asset from tax completely. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). Any prepaid expense is an
asset because an asset is simply an accounting measure of something that produces
future benefits.

HeinOnline -- 26 Va. Tax Rev. 171 2006-2007

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:125

compelling today, since the capitalization requirement has lost most of
its teeth and it is unlikely to prevent immediate deductibility under
section 162 of corporate payments to charities. Given the increasingly
strategic nature of corporate philanthropy and the relaxation of the
capitalization rules, there is very little corporate philanthropy that
would need to be capitalized today.
The bulk of corporate philanthropy that is not employee-related
is still business-related (except for the small amount that is agencycost philanthropy, which I have argued would be much harder to
justify without section 170). 53 Some is integral and strategic, such as
the science education underwritten by drug companies and the
technological training by tech companies.
Some is specifically
customer-based. The remainder may more generally be undertaken
with the expectation that such support will inure to the long-term
benefit of the company's business and is in the nature of advertising or
goodwill building among a variety of constituents, such as customers,
employees, and regulators. All these types of corporate philanthropy,
while varied along the scale of business connection, are sufficiently
business related to satisfy the "necessary" prong of section 162, which
has been interpreted by the case156 law to mean "appropriate and
helpful" in relation to the business.
The "ordinary" prong of section 162 goes to the capitalization
question: expenses are only "ordinary" if they are not required to be
capitalized and may instead be deducted immediately. 157 Employeebased philanthropy, as discussed above, fits well within the "current"
158
category, along with the cash compensation that employees receive.
Similarly, the more specific customer-based giving is likely to be
immediately deductible. For example, support of organizations that
hold their events at a store's location is reasonably connected to
bringing customers into the store at the time of the event.9

153
154

See supra Part III.A.

See supra Part II.C.

For example, customer-based philanthropy might include a scholarship
program open to customers or support of local charities by providing goods or
facilitating fundraising at the business locale.
156 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
157 See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) ("The principal function
155

of the term "ordinary" in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between
those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital
expenditures....").
158

See supra Part IV.A.

159

This is Wal-Mart's model. See Community Support, supra note 66.
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Therefore, any costs of that support should be immediately expensed
because they are related to the income earned in that period.
Anything that resembles everyday product advertising, such as public
radio and television sponsorships that appear like commercial
advertising during programming, should also be immediately
deductible, the same way that regular advertising is deductible. 6'
The more challenging examples of corporate philanthropy for the
capitalization question arise from the long-term educational and
sponsorship programs, which create future demand for products,
future benefits to the workforce, and goodwill.
While these
expenditures are sufficiently connected to the business to be
considered appropriate and helpful, they might all need to be
capitalized because they produce significant future benefits to the
162
company.
The Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
set a very high bar for immediate deductibility of expenses, stating
that •expensing
is the exception to the presumptive rule of
-.
.
163
capitalization.
A careful reading of INDOPCO makes the
capitalization requirement a serious obstacle to immediate
deductibility of much of this type of corporate philanthropy under
section 162. Goodwill and community building expenditures produce
long-term benefits that are unlikely to be incidental benefits and may
resemble the cases in which companies were required to capitalize
goodwill-building costs1 64
But since the high-water mark of INDOPCO more than a
decade ago, the rigor of the capitalization principle has eroded. The
Service has since allowed immediate deduction for a wide variety of
expenditures that produce benefits beyond the taxable year 16' and
160

This situation may be analogous to the customer-based incentives such as the

stock warrants issued to customers in Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 66
T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993). The court held that the costs were immediately deductible
because the future benefits were incidental. Id.
161 See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (ruling that regular
advertising costs do
not need to be capitalized, despite the long-term benefits that advertising provides).
162 This is the standard for capitalization in INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79 (1992).
163 Id. at 84.
164 See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 231-33
(1985) (holding that costs incurred to allay public fears of nuclear power were
sufficiently tied to the company's operating license, a capital asset, and therefore
required capitalization); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-11-005 (Nov. 26, 1985) (ruling that
package design costs created identifiable assets, which must be capitalized).
165 See Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331 (allowing immediate
deduction for
certification costs despite some future benefits and possible facilitation of business
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lower courts have repeatedly distinguished INDOPCO, significantly
narrowing the impact of the decision.1 66

Finally, the Treasury's

regulations on the capitalization of intangibles, effective at the end of
2003,167 are very generous to taxpayers seeking deductions and

significantly undercut the contours of the capitalization principle
described by the Supreme Court. 168 The regulations allow immediate
deduction of significant long-term advertising expenses. 16' They
overrule
1969
decision in Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
C
• the
•
170
Commissioner, which required that bottlers capitalize the costs of

signs and other tangible items bearing their logo and displayed in
retail outlets. Under the regulations, those types of costs may now be
immediately deducted despite their clear relationship to future

benefit.
Compared to the payments that businesses make to
charitable recipients, which allow their name to appear in the charity's
materials, the future benefit (compared to the current benefit) reaped
by businesses providing logo signs and the like seems more substantial
than the future benefit provided by corporate sponsorship of
charitable activities.
The regulations alter the capitalization norm by pulling back from
INDOPCO's future benefits inquiry and returning to the separate
asset approach from earlier cases. 171
They make clear that
"enhancements" to purchased goodwill do not need to be
capitalized. 172 An example in the regulations describes a program
expansion). Compare Cleveland Elec., 7 CI. Ct. at 231-33 (holding that costs incurred
to ally public fears of nuclear power must be capitalized), with I.R.S. Field Serv.
Advice Mem. 199939035 (Aug. 9, 1999) (advising that advertising and other goodwillbuilding costs incurred prior to regulatory approval are immediately deductible).
166 For example, loan origination costs have been allowed
to be expensed in PNC
Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner,212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000), and officers' salaries in a
restructuring have been allowed to be expensed in Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Commissioner,224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2004).
16' See Lee A. Sheppard, More Giveaways in Final Intangibles Capitalization
Rules, 102 TAX NOTES 12 (Jan. 5, 2004).
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(l), ex. 11 (2004).
170 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 635 (1969).
171 See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). The
preamble to the final regulations explicitly "avoid[s] any implication of a 'significant
future benefits' test." T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 447,449.
1
The preamble states:
For example, if a taxpayer acquires goodwill as part of the acquisition of a
trade or business, future expenditures to maintain the reputation of the
trade or business arguably could constitute amounts paid to "enhance" the
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promoting energy conservation that builds goodwill with customers
and reduces the company's future costs."' The regulation does not
require capitalization of the costs to consultants connected with these
programs and states: "While the amounts may serve to reduce future
operating and capital costs and create goodwill with customers, these
benefits, without more, are not intangibles for which capitalization is
required under this section.' 7 4 In addition, a Treasury Decision
provides that "amounts paid with the mere hope or expectation of
developing or maintaining a business relationship are not required to
be capitalized.', 175 These examples are interesting because they
highlight the theoretical overlap between business expenditures that
do not produce clear benefits and philanthropic expenditures that
follow essentially the same model.176 Following these regulations,
almost all corporate philanthropy would likely satisfy the standard for
immediate
deductibility;
reputation
and
goodwill-building
philanthropy is only vaguely connected with the production of a
specific intangible asset producing future income.
If my interpretation of the (non) application of section 263 to
corporate philanthropy is correct, repeal of the corporate deduction
under section 170 should require very little disruption to corporate
charity - the same expenditures that were previously deducted under
section 170 would now be expensed under section 162 pursuant to the
regular timing rules for accrual method taxpayers, regardless of
payment. But, if there are situations in which capitalization might still
be significant, not much violence would be done to the Code if
Congress or the Treasury adopted a relaxation of the capitalization
requirement to allow corporations to deduct goodwill-enhancing

acquired goodwill. The final regulations remove the word "enhance" in
favor of more specifically identifying the types of enhancement for which
capitalization is appropriate.
Id. at 448.
173 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(l), ex.
4 (2004).
174 Id.
175 T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 447, 449. The regulations state:
An amount paid to another party is not paid to create, originate, enter into,
renew or renegotiate a financial interest with that party if the payment is
made with the mere hope or expectation of developing or maintaining a
business relationship with that party and is not contingent on the
origination, renewal or renegotiation of a financial interest with that party.
Treas. Reg. §1.263(a)-4(d)(2)(ii) (2004).
176 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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expenditures made to section 501(c)(3) organizations.
A generous
deduction regime would be worthwhile if it offered a solution to the
problem of separating out the few bad, welfare-reducing corporate
payments to charity from the many desirable, welfare-enhancing
corporate payments to charity. Section 162 would operate to police
corporate expenditures, ensuring that the payments are "appropriate
and helpful" to the corporation's business, with the wide
interpretation that requirement has been given. Any payment made
for the purpose of aggrandizing the corporation's chairman - for
example, providing a job for the CEO's daughter or secretly
supporting controversial political groups - would fail the section 162
standard. 78 The Code has long contained subsidies for contributors to
charity and a relaxation of the capitalization rule, rather than a
deduction section 170 for corporations, is a better approach to the
subsidy because of the corporate and tax law benefits that change
would bring. The opportunities for abuse and the dangers to the
corporate tax base are few from a charity-only exception to an
otherwise strict capitalization requirement.
Corporations have long had a choice of deduction for businessThe section 162
related payments to charitable organizations.
deduction preceded the adoption of the section 170 deduction for
corporations and section 162 has always been available to
purchases
from
charitable
corporations
making
business
organizations. 7 1 Section 170 limits the deduction to 10% of the
taxpayer's modified income' 8° and taxpayers may not claim any excess
over that percentage limitation as a trade or business expense.181
177

1

say this because the adopted regulations have already eviscerated the

integrity of the capitalization requirement. See Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax
Base: The Proposed INDOPCO CapitalizationRegulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381 (June
2, 2003).
178 See Diana B. Henriques, A Celebrity Boss Faces Exile
from 2d Corporate
Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at Al (detailing William and Mary Agee's
sprawling appropriation of Morrison Knudsen's corporate resources); Leon Lazaroff,
Ex-Tyco Chief, Top Lieutenant Found Guilty; Face 25-Year Terms for Grand Larceny,
CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2005, at 1 (highlighting Dennis Kozlowski spending millions on
personal use as CEO of Tyco).
179 See., e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65 (holding that payments
to an oil
pollution control fund could be deducted as ordinary and necessary business
expense).
180 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2).
181 I.R.C. § 162(b).
That section can be read more broadly to create a hierarchy
under which any expenditure eligible for section 170 treatment must be deducted
under section 170 rather than section 162 because it includes a limitation based on the

HeinOnline -- 26 Va. Tax Rev. 176 2006-2007

2006]

EncouragingCorporateCharity

Thus, it is not surprising that corporations do not characterize their
expenditures as charitable giving in excess of that amount. ' 82 If they
are going to exceed that limitation, they have long been well-advised
to characterize the expenditure as a section 162 expense.
Relaxing the capitalization requirement in lieu of retaining
section 170 for corporations changes the perspective on corporate
contributions.
Under section 170, the assumption is that the
corporation takes money out of profits already earned and gives those
profits away, thereby removing such profits from the tax base. Section
170 is thus backward-looking. On the other hand, relaxing the
capitalization requirement is forward-looking.
It treats the
contribution as a cost of producing future income and exempts that
income from tax when and if it is earned. Because the precise amount
and timing of income earned on account of corporate giving is very
difficult to measure and the duration of any corporate benefit is
uncertain, neither the corporation nor the government can be sure
how much income (if any) will be exempt from tax, when analyzed
this way. This perspective on the treatment of corporate giving
appears to cost the government, as well as the shareholders, less than
the section 170 approach, but it may present a more accurate measure
because it recognizes that corporate giving hopes to be, but does not
always succeed in being, profit enhancing.
This change in perspective is incompatible with the 10%
limitation currently applicable to corporations. Section 170(b)(2)
limits deductible corporate contributions to charity to 10% of the
corporation's income. But it does not make good tax sense to limit
the deduction for corporate contributions if we are trying to
accurately measure a corporation's income. The more compelling the
argument is for treating corporate charity as a business expense under
section 162, the more compelling it is to allow those deductions in full,
regardless of their share of corporate income. The 10% limitation
creates a badge of illegitimacy for corporate philanthropy. Even
though corporations are unlikely to devote more than 10% to exempt
purposes, removal of that badge increases the justification for those
payments, at any level. By changing the perspective from after-profit
to pre-income, any limitation based on income is inconsistent with the
treatment of the expenditure as a cost of producing income
time of payment rules in section 170.
182 The statistic on corporate charity is always much lower than the 10% limit
imposed by section 170, but is determined based on tax information. In 2002,
corporations gave 1.8% of pretax profits to charity. GIVING USA 2003, supra note
104, at 97; see id. at 4 (describing methodology based on tax return information).
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(effectively or not). This change could, potentially, lead to greater
support for charity than current law. The 10% limitation signals the
suspect nature of the covered expenditures.
While very few
corporations approach that amount, characterization of payments to
charities as business expenses increase their legitimacy. If payments
from corporations to charities do contribute to profit maximization,
they are inappropriately deducted as gifts, which are transfers without
corresponding benefits.
V. ENCOURAGING PHILANTHROPY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
CORPORATION

The shift to section 162 might encourage more charity than the
current regime for a variety of reasons. First, it dispenses with a statelaw safe harbor that relies on the existence of taxable income and the
effective ceiling on contributions that the tax rule imposes. Since the
charitable deduction for corporations is available for amounts up to
10% of income, ' 83 it depends on the existence of net income.
Corporations have become increasingly adept at reducing or
eliminating their tax liability: debt capitalization and corporate tax
shelters allow corporations to significantly reduce their tax liability,
even when they are profitable.'8
One study has shown that
corporations with higher debt-to-value .•ratios
give less to charity than
185
firms with lower debt-to-value ratios.
Those firms also have
substantial deductions from interest expense, minimizing their
corporate tax liability and the corresponding 10% limit under section
170. If a corporation has no taxable income, then the safe-harbor
benchmark of the tax statute, which has been adopted as the state-law
standard for an appropriate level of corporate giving,M disappears.
Would a contribution be treated as unreasonable because it is in
excess of 10% of a corporation's modest taxable income? It would be
unfortunate if the success of a corporation in managing its tax liability
183

Congress temporarily lifted the 10% limitation for 2005.

See Katrina

Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, §301, 119 Stat. 2016, 2022-23.
184 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., TESTIMONY OF THE
STAFF OF

THE JOINT

PENALTIES

AND

COMMITTEE

CORPORATE

TAX

ON TAXATION
SHELTERS

CONCERNING

BEFORE

THE

INTEREST AND

SENATE

FINANCE

at 15-18 (Joint Comm. Print 2000), available at http://www.house.gov/
jct/x-23-00.pdf.
185 Brown et al., supra note 96.
The authors concluded from their data that
COMMITTEE,

creditors are effective monitors of the agency costs of corporate giving, but the tax
explanation seems more compelling. See id.
186 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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undermined its ability to give to charity on account of the percentage
constraints. A corporation that reports only a small amount of
taxable income, but a great deal of book income, should be justified,
under the reasonableness standard applicable under state law, in both
giving and deducting more than 10%, but there is no authority to
support that conclusion. A section 162 deduction is available dollar
for dollar on corporate income, without any percentage limitation, so
it would not interact with other tax-minimizing strategies that might
reduce corporate giving as a by-product.
Second, removing the percentage limitation lifts a pall that hangs
over corporate giving - even for amounts that are within the limit.
The 10% limit is significantly lower than the statutory limit applicable
to individual giving,'8 7 making corporate giving suspect by comparison.
Discomfort with corporate giving, as reflected in the limitation, may
have been appropriate when corporate philanthropy was accurately
conceptualized as profit-reducing gifts of shareholder property, but
that view is not fitting today. Corporate philanthropy is singled out in
the Code in this way, for restrictive treatment, despite the fact that
there is nothing evasive about it. Removing the limitation is an
important symbolic gesture about the acceptability of corporate
philanthropy throughout business cycles and at significant levels.
Third, a section 162 deduction is more stable than a deduction
under section 170. The difference between section 162 and section
170 could be significant in the context of tax reform, since the effects
of reform are likely to differ depending on where a deduction falls in
the statutory scheme. Although President Bush has declared his
protection for the charitable contribution deduction, in tax reform
plans, the section 170 deduction is likely to be more vulnerable than
the deduction under section 162. 88 For example, the President's
Advisory Panel on Tax Reform recommended that the charitable
contribution be subject to a floor of 1% of net income for all
taxpayers,18 9 but a parallel limitation for business expenses was not
suggested and would seem absurd to many people. If corporate
payments to charities are ensconced safely under the auspices of
section 162 prior to major reform, there will be no discussion about
Individuals are subject to 50% and 30% of net income limitations. See I.R.C.
§ 170(b).
188 The Blueprints model income tax proposal allows no deductions for charitable
187

gifts. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY
FOR BAsIC TAX REFORM 86 (2d ed., rev. 1984).
189

TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS

See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR AND

PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM

75 (2005).
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limiting it; business deductions are necessary to determine "net
income" under an income tax. Similarly, if major tax reform
constitutes adoption of a consumption tax, business deductions remain
part of that model as well, whereas charitable contributions are more
controversial.9 In addition, the shift to a consumption tax would
solve the capitalization question for corporate giving because all
business expenses are immediately deducted in a consumption tax.
Fourth, the consolidation of all aspects of corporate
responsibility, assimilating business expenses with charitable gifts,
under section 162 increases the integrity and coherence of the tax law
because it includes the various activities executed by corporations,
which fall along a continuum. By placing all those activities in the
same category, it encourages them all equally, which may prove to be
an important step in preserving corporate support for charity. The tax
law currently treats corporate charitable giving as separate and
distinct from other activities of corporations by segregating it in
section 170. But it is just one small part of a corporation's overall
citizenship strategy, which blends elements of both altruism and selfinterest.
The separate treatment of corporate philanthropy compared to corporate citizenship with respect to the work force, the
environment, and the customer - creates an undue burden of
justification on those activities, compared to the activities that are
presumed to be part of the business operations. The clear division
between other-regarding charity and profit-increasing business has
converged from both ends, leaving the dichotomy between section 162
expenses and section 170 expenses significantly muddied. As the
distinction between philanthropy and business continues to blur, the
separation between section 162 and section 170 becomes harder to
identify and impossible to enforce.
In a recent survey about corporate citizenship, charitable giving
ranked last in a list of twelve behaviors that • survey
participants
•
- 191
considered important in evaluating corporate citizenship.
The most
important behaviors were the corporation's treatment of employees
and its adherence to honest business practices.9 These developments
pose a concern for charities and threaten the policies that the law
The Blueprints model treats charitable gifts as consumption by the donor,
which are therefore non-deductible. See BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY
STAFF, supra note 188, at 104-05. The popular "flat tax" contains no deduction for
charitable gifts. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 105-06
(2d ed. 1995).
191 Jensen, supra note 43, at 20 (citing study by GolinHarris).
190

192

Id.
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reflects towards corporate support of them. Under the current
system, traditional corporate philanthropy seems destined to be an
increasingly minor player, compared to the issues that pertain
integrally to the corporation's business. The halo from corporate
giving is apparently fainter than people might have once thought and
corporations are responding by tethering their charitable
contributions more closely to their core corporate initiatives, using
corporate donations "as a strategy to increase profits through
'
marketing efforts or other means."193
Thus, charitable giving has
become more responsive to the bottom line, while businesses are
under increasing pressure to become more responsible to various
communities within their stakeholders.
It is time to consider the full range of public benefit activities
together in the tax law, by leveling the field for all such activities
under a single tax standard.
It should make us increasingly
uncomfortable if the expansion of corporate philanthropy - as
defined in and pigeonholed by section 170 - takes place in the face of
contracting opportunities and unacceptable conditions for workers,
degradation of the environment, and unethical business practices.
How is it possible that Wal-Mart can be both a model of corporate
philanthropy'94 and a cruel employer?' 9
While recharacterization
under the tax law alone cannot change the way that corporations
conduct their operations, it can encourage all approaches to public
responsibility without privileging one over any other.
Critics may argue that the shift from treating corporate giving
under section 170 to section 162 reduces the transparency of corporate
giving, but I would argue that the loss of transparency offers certain
benefits in this case. First, since corporations are under more pressure
to produce short-term earnings than to do good works, less
shareholder scrutiny might allow more circumspect decisions about
long-term profitability and social value. Second, less public scrutiny
would be offset by greater scrutiny by the Service because switching to
section 162 would allow the Service more oversight in determining
193Ian Wilhelm, Corporate Giving Rebounds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 4,

2005, at 7, 18.
194 In 2004, Wal-Mart, the leader in charitable giving, was most frequently named
as a strong corporate citizen. See Press Release, Cone Inc., supra note 5. But see
America's Most-Hated Companies, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 91 (discussing a
straw poll showing Wal-Mart as the most hated company in America).
195 See Steven Greenhouse, Parrying Its Critics, Wal-Mart
Says Its Wages Must
Stay Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2005, at C1 (reporting that Wal-Mart workers
have no health insurance and must resort to public assistance).
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whether an expense is ordinary and necessary. That requirement
would make it harder for managers to engage in agency-cost
philanthropy than under section 170. Finally, there is not much
transparency to lose in this area. While corporate foundations file
Form 990s that are widely available, 196 there is a great deal of data on
corporate giving that is not available under current law because
corporate tax returns are not public and corporations are not required
by SEC rules to disclose anything about their giving. 197 Even so, many
corporations do publicize their charitable activities and the current
trend is for businesses to try to more effectively use corporate giving
in their business, so corporations will continue to have an incentive to
provide information, regardless of their ability to withhold it.
In a post-JGTRRA world, shareholders should increasingly
demand that payments to charity are wealth-enhancing to the
corporation, bolstering a deduction under section 162 and reducing
the attractiveness of section 170 to corporations subject to those
demands. When individual rates on dividends were high, shareholders
had a higher tolerance for managerial discretion over corporate
funds.198 Now that rates are lower for dividends, shareholder
acceptance of wealth-minimizing strategies in the corporation should
be less acceptable because the tax treatment of a payout is more
advantageous compared to accumulation. The reduced rate of tax on
dividends changes the determination about whether corporations
should accumulate earnings or pay them out and the new pressure on
corporations to pay dividends more generally' 99 could impede all other
internal uses of corporate earnings, including philanthropy.
VI. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that there are many threats to corporate
support of charity in the current environment, most of them byproducts of other policies that may not be inherently troublesome.
196
197

See, e.g., GuideStar, http://www.guidestar.org.
In an analysis of foundation giving, "nearly half of corporate grants could not

be coded by type of support for a lack of information provided by the funder."
ATIENZA & ALTMAN, supra note 96, at 61.
198 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Incredible Shrinking Domain of Corporate Stock,
103 TAX NOTES 871, 875-76 (May 17, 2004).
'99
Studies have found significant increases in dividends following the passage of
JGTRRA. See Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Do Dividend Payments Respond to
Taxes? PreliminaryEvidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10572, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w10572; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Lower dividend taxes make corporate giving less attractive and
increase pressure on corporations to pay out dividends. Low effective
tax rates for corporations reduce the tax benefits of corporate giving.
The death of Berkshire Hathaway's model philanthropy program for reasons completely separate from the merits of it as a mechanism
for maximizing tax benefits and minimizing agency costs - illustrates
the unfortunate divergence of ideal theory and practical
implementation.
We are at a crossroads for corporate philanthropy and the
support of many organizations depends on how corporations respond
to the many, sometimes conflicting, pressures from their shareholders,
customers, and communities. I have argued that the tax law should
reform to treat corporate charitable giving like all other investments
corporations make in their businesses and that the recent adoption of
new capitalization regulations should make that transition legally
frictionless. While the change might seem technical, it has the
potential to encourage more and better charitable giving, to reduce
agency costs, and to improve the coherence of the tax law.
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